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OUTLAW HEAVEN: WHY STATES BECOME TAX HAVENS
It is the argument of this dissertation that states become tax havens as a conscious
economic development strategy. These states – more properly referred to as “jurisdictions”
because some lack the sovereignty of the traditional Westphalian state – do not have the
natural resources or the population to pursue more traditional economic development
strategies, but they do have the ability to write and implement laws that create a virtual
resource: banking secrecy. These jurisdictions are to carry out this strategy because they tend
to be well-governed, stable, and relatively wealthy, making them attractive partners for the
international banking, law, and accounting firms that drive offshore finance, and then for
their customers – both individual and corporate – as well. The qualities tax havens possess
also enable them to calculate that the benefits they reap from pursuing this strategy outweigh
any penalties assessed by anti-tax haven international collective action activities, such as the
naming and shaming campaigns of 2000.
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Chapter One
Cuba, The Bahamas, Jamaica, the Cayman Islands, and the Paths They Took
The Bay Street Boys had had a good run, but it was coming to an end. The ruling
elite of the Bahamas, so nicknamed because the men met at a club in Nassau on Bay Street,
had taken what was a relatively quiet, if willing, outwardly focused economy with a modest
amount of activity in the 1930s and turned it into a major hub of banking and gambling
activity by the early 1960s. The Boys did not accomplish this feat all by themselves – they
had help from two people: Marshall Langer and Meyer Lansky (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Lacey,
1991; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).
Langer was an American tax attorney who started practicing in 1951 and consulted
with the government of the Bahamas in rewriting its tax laws to encourage an increase in
investment from outside the islands. The Bahamas already had a reputation in America as
having a favorable tax environment, but Langer helped create an atmosphere of
supercharged international development in the late 1950s (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan,
Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).
Lansky, on the other hand, was one of the most powerful members of the “Outfit,”
the Chicago organized crime syndicate once run by Al Capone. In fact, after Capone went to
jail for tax evasion in 1931, Lansky became one of the first Americans to start using Swiss
banks to launder money in 1932. Lansky would fly to Switzerland with suitcases stuffed with
cash, jewelry, bearer bonds, and anything of value that was portable and could be
reconverted into cash quickly. He would deposit the funds into a Swiss bank, and the bank
would then loan an equivalent amount to one of the companies Lansky had set up in
America. The bank got its money back when Lansky repaid the loans which, since they were
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from his businesses, were tax deductible. This technique – soon to become standard practice
– was called “loaning back” (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010;
Shaxson, 2012).
The money Lansky was laundering mainly came from different forms of gambling –
casinos and horse racing – which had the disadvantage of being illegal in America. Cuba, on
the other hand, was a different story, and Lansky’s operations in Cuba in the 1950s turned
the island into “the most decadent spot on the planet” (Robinson, 2004: 37). Lansky’s
success in turning Cuba into a louche vacation spot for Americans was so great, in fact, that
it led in part to the 1959 revolution that installed Fidel Castro, necessitating a new island
paradise for Lansky to transform (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Lacey, 1991; Palan, Murphy, &
Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).
Enter the Bay Street Boys. They were all too willing to partner with Lansky and
together the Boys and Lansky created the Grand Bahamas Development Corporation
(DEVCO), which gave Lansky and his partners a foothold on the island. Lansky also paid
Bahamian finance minister Stafford Sands a $1.8 million bribe to help make the island’s
government more cooperative, the result of which was stricter laws pertaining to banks
releasing information about their customers to anyone, including criminal investigators.
These laws made the Bahamas an even more attractive destination for money launderers and
tax evaders, and development on the island boomed (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Lacey, 1991;
Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Robinson, 2004; Shaxson, 2012).
Until 1967. As in Cuba, popular discontent with the way the mafia and the local elites
were despoiling the island led the Bahamians to revolt, albeit peacefully. The 1967 election
was won by Lynden Pindling, a populist who ran on a reform platform calling for an end to
gambling and corruption. This platform was not as threatening to what would become
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known as the “offshore” crowd – bankers, accountants, and lawyers like Langer who make
their living creating new tax avoidance and evasion strategies for wealthy individuals and
multi-national corporations (MNCs) – as the fact that Pindling was black and was calling for
end to white minority rule; an end, as it were, to the rule of the Bay Street Boys. While the
Bahamas remained, and would continue to remain, prosperous and relatively unaffected by
the Pindling movement that led to independence in 1973, the smart money went elsewhere
(Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Robinson, 2004; Shaxson, 2012).
There were two choices. Two nearby islands with the British legal pedigree that
allowed for the passage of banking secrecy and foreign ownership laws necessary to create a
safe haven for offshore money and its handlers: Jamaica; and Jamaica’s former dependent the
Cayman Islands. Jamaica was more developed and in the throes of a growing economy
thanks to high demand for the bauxite it mined and exported, and definitely more advanced
than the backwater the Cayman Islands was at the time. Jamaica was also politically more
sophisticated, having declared its independence from Great Britain in 1962. More disturbing
to the offshore community was the election the following year, which was won by William
Alexander Bustamante and the Jamaican Labor Party. It didn’t seem to matter that the Labor
Party was not socialist in the manner of the English political party of the same name; the
Jamaicans seemed determined to control their own political and economic destiny (BrittainCatlin, 2005; Library of Congress, 1989).
As it turned out, the ruling elite of the Caymans had no such pretensions. Granted,
the Caymans declared itself independent of Jamaica in 1959 and created its own
constitution, but chose to remain a British crown colony when given the option in 1962.
This amount of soveriegnty turned out exactly what the Cayman selectorate desired:
independent enough to write their own laws and levy their own taxes, but still tied to the
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body of British common law such that its precedents in cases like Calcutta Jute Mills and
Egyptian Delta 1 held, allowing the Caymans to create the most inviting investment and
banking environment in the Caribbean, if not the world (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan,
Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).
The effect of the new attention on the Caymans was almost immediate. The island
had never had taxes of any consequence on its citizens, raising revenue for the government
through import duties, and the sale of postage stamps and banking licenses, as well as from
the fees companies pay to incorporate there. Their one and only bank – a Barclay’s – had
opened in 1953. The bank sat on the one paved road in George Town, the capital city of
Grand Cayman, the largest island. It was likely that the bank’s customers – who would not be
able to call ahead because the island had no phone system – would encounter cattle
wandering the streets on their way to patronize the bank. This was life in the Caymans until
1966, when bankers like the newly arrived Jean Doucet helped convince the legislature to
pass a series of new laws, including the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Law, the
Trusts Law, the Exchange Control Regulations Law. These laws were created mostly from
ideas the bankers themselves suggested in committee meetings chaired by the Cayman
Islands Financial Secretary and passed with minimal debate or opposition by the legislature
after passing through the Private Sector Consultative Committee, a trade association made
up Caymanian financial professionals who had to give any financially-oriented legislation its
imprimatur before it was voted on. These laws made it much easier to create trusts like the
Star Trust, which allows the owner of the trust to be protected in such a way that enables
1

Calcutta Jute Mills, Ltd. V. Nicholson (Surveyor of Taxes) in 1876 found that, for tax purposes, a
company’s residence is wherever its “central management and control” is located (Calcutta Jute Mills Ltd.
v. Nicholson (Surveyor of Taxes), 1876). Egyptian Delta Land and Investment Company, Ltd. V. Todd in
1929 found that companies founded by British citizens but headquartered outside the UK were not liable
for British tax (Egyptian Delta Land & Investment Company, Ltd. v. Todd, 1929).
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the owner to make investment decisions without having to worry about what impact those
decisions will have on the beneficiaries of the trusts. Or to open banks like the Sterling
Bank, which Doucet opened in 1966 as one of the first private banks on the islands
(Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).
The offshore money began to pour in and by 1967 the Caymans was a state-of-theart investment hub, with connections to the international telephone network and a new
airport built specifically to handle jet traffic. Corporate lawyers like Bill Walker, who had
moved from Guyana in 1963, had more business than they could handle. By the end of the
1960s, when the Caymans abolished their bilateral tax treaties with the United States in order
to give their banking customers complete and total confidentiality from American law
enforcement and tax authorities, they were on their way to becoming one of the world’s
largest banking and incorporation centers (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, &
Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).
Her Majesty’s Government was initially positive about the Cayman Islands’ success.
The British Colonial Reports acted as booster, reinforcing the initial opinion of the Bank of
England and the British Overseas Development Ministry that any economic growth is good
and that a colony that develops its own economic base is a colony that will no longer have to
beg for British aid, thereby reducing costs to the British government. Official opinion within
the British government was hardly united, and began to splinter further as the Caymans
gradually abandoned all pretense about what they were doing, going so far as to establish a
government Tax Haven Committee in 1970 to “expand and promote tax haven activities on
the island” (Brittain-Catlin, 2005: 152).
It did not take long, however, for even the Caymans’ hardiest supporters in British
government to recognize what the islands had become. As the Bank of England noted on
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April 11, 1969, “the smaller, less sophisticated and remote islands are receiving almost
constant attention and blandishments from expatriate operators who aspire to turn them
into their own private empires. The administrations in these places find it difficult to
understand what is involved and resist tempting offers” (Shaxson, 2012: 92). Condescending
language aside, the Bank correctly analyzed the increased attention the Caymans were
receiving from the outside world, both licit and illicit. By the early 1970s, every major
American bank had a branch in the Caymans to compete for the rapidly growing deposit
business there, some of the money literally being flown in on Lear jets in suitcases carrying
millions of dollars in cash. Not only did the banks and the Caymanian officials not worry
about where the money came from, but the island’s police force would happily provide an
escort from the airport to the bank for customers carrying large amounts of cash (BrittainCatlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).
Where the Bank was wrong was in its interpretation of the Caymanian officials being
victimized by their more-worldly peers in the offshore business. From the beginning in the
mid-1960s, the intention of the Caymanian officials was to create a very specific niche,
hosting tax law and accounting experts from the offshore world to help them create laws
that would allow them to compete with the likes of Liechtenstein and Switzerland. There
was a conscious effort that led to the legislative jewel in the crown: The Confidential
Relationships (Preservation) Law of 1976. This law, in response to increased pressure from
American banking and law enforcement authorities, made it a crime punishable by prison to
reveal any financial or banking client information regardless of who made the request. In
fact, the law also criminalized the request for information by anyone other than clients. This
was the culmination of a ten-year collaborative effort by the Cayman government and
offshore interests to, as a 1973 British Foreign Office confidential memorandum correctly
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concluded, “set up as a tax haven” (Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux,
2010; Shaxson, 2012: 91).
The Puzzle, the Literatures, and the Contribution
Why do states become tax havens? Is the Cayman experience typical? Is this
combination of political will and outside influence the way that states become tax havens? If
the potential benefits are so great, why do other states like Cuba or Jamaica not also become
tax havens? These are the primary questions I will attempt to answer in this dissertation. Tax
havens exist in the international system despite nearly universal official disapprobation.
States recognized as tax havens are classified as, if not exactly pariahs, then not exactly
members of the community of nations in good standing, either. Phrases in common
parlance like “Swiss bank account” have almost exclusively negative connotations; indeed,
one popular rumor is that millions in gold stolen by the Nazis during World War II is still
hidden in Swiss banks, with the complicity of amoral Swiss bankers (Guex, 2000). Since the
late 1990s, in fact, there have been concerted international efforts to deter what the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development called “harmful tax
competition” (OECD, 1998), an effort that evolved to include anti-money laundering and
terrorism financing efforts. It became common knowledge that tax evaders, criminals, and
even Osama bin Laden and other terrorists were using tax havens (Baker, 2005; Naylor,
2004).
The prevalence of these efforts raises another question: how is it that tax havens
continue to operate? While every tax haven complies, in one form or another, with the
requests of the international organizations tasked with shutting them down, very few tax
havens have ceased operations in the face of such concerted effort. And these states are
hardly regional powers, much less hegemons; most are small – 4 million people or fewer –
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and, in security terms, weak. A good portion of tax havens don’t even provide for their own
defense, instead relying on timeworn colonial relationships for domestic security. Yet most
of them have taken a stand against the most powerful states in the world – both in economic
and military terms – and have persevered, continuing to attract hundreds of billions of
dollars each year in foreign direct investment. How have the Seychelles, for example, a state
independent only since 1976 and with a population of around 96,000, able to withstand the
collective efforts of the US, the EU, and Japan and continue to thrive economically? Just as
important, how did states like the Seychelles become tax havens in the first place? What is it
about these srates that enabled them to make the relatively sophisticated moves required to
achieve tax haven status, and then to remain tax havens in the face of almost universal
disapprobation?
This dissertation will attempt to answer these questions by locating its argument in a
nexus of three literatures: tax havens; small states; and regimes. The tax haven and small
states literatures will be used to take previous operational definitions of tax havens and use
them to differentiate a distinct group of jurisdictions that shares characteristics of, but is
different from, non-tax haven small states. Tax haven literature, exemplified by the work of
Christensen (2011, 2012), Dharmapala & Hines (2009), Eden & Kudrle (2005), and Palan,
Murphy, & Chavagneux (2010), among others, is useful for pinning down what a tax haven
is, what distinguishes it from other states, as well as defining its place in the international
system. There has not yet, however, been a large-scale systematic examination of the process
by which states become tax havens. Examinations exist, but they tend to be case studies, or
focused on one particular region, or both. This dissertation will attempt to fill this gap in the
literature by taking the existing work and broadening its scope, allowing us to conceive of
tax havens as rational actors in an anarchic international system, in effect applying principles
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of realism and macroeconomics to better understand the transformation these states
undergo and the forces that impel them.
In order to accomplish this chracterization, however, it is important to understand
how tax havens exist as small states, what differentiates small states from larger ones, how
this differentiation affects tax haven formation, and what distinguishes tax havens as a
separate group from non-tax haven small states. As the dissertation’s analysis will discuss in
greater depth, tax havens are states with populations of fewer than four million people in all
but a handful of cases. In addition, a significant number of tax havens are located on islands.
It is therefore critical to understand the small states literature, in particular the Small Island
Economy (SIE) work of Armstrong, De Kervenoael, Li, & Read (1998), Cobb (1998, 2001),
Hampton (1996), and Vlcek (2008, 2009), among others. These works delve into the role
small states play in the global economy, and why small state governance enables that role.
This literature, combined with classics of political development such as Acemoglu &
Robinson (2006), Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow (2004), Jackson (1990),
and Lipset (1959), provide a solid theoretical foundation understanding the nature of tax
havens both as small states and as a sui generis phenomenon. In addition, one surprising
development of the research for this dissertation is the extent to which tax havens and small
states – especially states with populations of one million or fewer – overlap, suggesting that
perhaps what the literature observes as small state political behavior might actually be tax
haven behavior.
Finally, in order to understand why states become tax havens in the face of
international anti-tax haven regimes formed by the world’s strongest states, it is critical to
understand the nature of international regimes themselves, and why states comply with
them. This understanding must of necessity start with the seminal 1982 issue of International

9

Organizations that included the landmark work of Keohane (1982), Krasner (1982), and
Puchala & Hopkins (1982), and progress to (Abbott & Snidal (1998) and Nadelmann (1990),
among others, to understand why states create international regimes, especially international
prohibition regimes, and why states would relinquish sovereignty to join one and act
collectively.
This is the first half of regime theory that needs to be understood in order to solve
the tax haven puzzle. The second half is why target states would comply with regime edicts,
especially punitive ones, what the consequences of non-compliance are, and how effective
international regimes are at accomplishing their goals. This literature involves studying the
conquences of compliance in general as well as naming and shaming campaigns and includes
Barry, Clay, & Flynn (2013), Chayes & Chayes (1993), and Dai (2005), while literature
specifically addressing tax haven compliance includes Blanton & Blanton (2012), Kudrle
(2009), and Simmons (2000). The final piece in understanding compliance is reputation
theory, of which Tomz (2007) is the exemplar.
The argument for this dissertation has three basic components based on three
literatures: what about states compels them to become tax havens; what influence their being
small, sometimes isolated, states has on this process; and the relationship between these
states and the international regime created to dissuade them from tax haven behavior. This
argument builds on the contributions made by the tax haven, small states, and regime
literatures by taking a global systemic approach and integrating it with an understanding of
individual state behavior and the role of elites in both states and regime formation and
implementation. This dissertation represents the first attempt at a study of this combination
of theoretical and quantitative rigor and interdisciplinary flexibility, a combination necessary
to answer questions concerning the process by which tax havens form, thrive, and continue
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to operate in an international political and economic system despite their significant
deleterious impact on that system and the states that form the regimes to eliminate them.
What is a Tax Haven?
Before answering these questions, however, it is important to define what the term
“tax haven” means, and to discuss its basic characteristics and the literature surrounding that
definition.
Sovereignty: from Westphalia to Vanuatu
Most definitions of the term “tax haven” involve four separate concepts: tax havens
are 1) jurisdictions that offer customers 2) low or no taxes, 3) transactional secrecy, and 4)
ease of registration and relatively low corporate activity requirements (Addison, 2009;
Ambrosanio & Beard, 1985-1986; Caroppo, 2005; Christensen, 2011; Cobham, Jansky, &
Meinzer, 2015; Dharmapala, 2008; Gregory, 2012; Irish, 1982; Murphy, 2017; OECD, 1998;
Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010, among others). It is instructive that, when describing
tax havens, the legal term “jurisdiction” rather than “state” is used in both academic and
non-academic texts. This distinction is a critical one to draw: going back in Western law to
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the state is an independent unit that enjoys both legal and
actual self-determination (Patrick, 2011: 22-3).
Strictly speaking, almost half of all tax havens do not fit this definition: they are not
states. Several of the states generally considered to be tax havens are under the protection of
a full-fledged state, either as a colony, dependency, or protectorate. Of the 51 jurisdictions
classified as “tax havens” for the purposes of this study, 17 are not fully independent states,
or 33%. For the purposes of their customers, however, these jurisdictions don’t need to be
fully sovereign; they just need to be sovereign enough to provide the two dimensions of
soverieignty necessary to create an effective tax haven: 1) geographic; and 2) legal.
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The demand for geographic separation by tax haven customers is made plain in the
common usage another term used to describe tax havens: “Offshore Financial Centers
(OFCs)” (Cobb, 1998; Hampton & Levi, 1999; Hudson, 2000). OFCs are generally referred
to as “offshore” for short, as is the whole industry and the professionals employed therein.
The term reflects a desire by its customers to withdraw, to hide their funds and their
activities away from prying eyes. Regulators make the onshore/offshore distinction in the
following way: the state where the customer makes her home or has her primary citizenship
is “onshore;” the state where the customer transacts her business or has accounts or
corporations established for the purpose of obscuring their activities is “offshore.” This
nomenclature holds regardless of whether the OFC in question is an island or not:
Switzerland, Costa Rica, and Latvia are all OFCs, but they are also landlocked.
The above states may not be islands in the geographical sense of the term
“offshore,” but they are in the second, or legislative sense. The laws that characterize a state
as an OFC/tax haven 2 provide its customers with a legislative wall of secrecy behind which
they can hide their financial transactions. The key to understanding a tax haven’s importance
is that it is a physical entity that has sovereignty, and it uses that sovereignty to create laws
and regulations for the benefit of its financial services customers who generally live
elsewhere. These laws include protecting bank employees who refuse to disclose information
about their customers, as well as an institutionalized lack of curiosity about those customers’
identities and the purposes of the transactions undertaken. The goal of offshoring is to
create both physical and legal space between financial activities and the government agencies
charged with regulating and taxing those activities (Christensen, 2011: 183; Cobb, 1998: 8;
Hampton & Levi, 1999: 646; Hudson, 2000: 270; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 21).
2

For simplicity’s sake, I will use the term “tax haven” for the rest of the dissertation.
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One condition both necessary and sufficient to define a tax haven is that the
jurisdiction offer a tax regime that includes zero or very low rates of taxation. These regimes
are set up primarily to benefit foreign investors, and some tax havens in the past have
practiced “ring fencing,” or levying zero or very low tax rates to individuals or companies
based in another conducting financial transactions while based in another jurisdiction, while
levying higher tax rates on its own citizens. The idea is to create something of value to
attract foreign capital where there previously had been none or very little. That “something”
in the case of tax havens is the opportunity to conduct business or to open a bank account
without having to pay the taxes such activities would attract in their home countries. There
are other benefits a jurisdiction can provide to foreign individuals and corporations without
offering zero or very low tax rates – secrecy and ease of incorporation (more below) – but
when the literature or the outside experts refer to “tax havens,” the jurisdictions to which
they refer almost always offer at least preferential tax regimes to foreign investors. Finally, a
tax haven may create an income tax regime that gives breaks to a specific type of industry,
such as insurance or banking (Ambrosanio & Caroppo, 2005: 686; Desai, Foley, & Hines,
2004: 1; Dharmapala, 2008: 662; Gregory, 2012: 863; Irish, 1982: 453-4; Johannsen, 2010:
254; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 30-1).
The second condition that defines a jurisdiction as a tax haven is its use of secrecy to
attract foreign investors and other customers, and to protect them once they become
customers. Secrecy is so important as a concept to tax havens that another term of art used
to describe tax havens is “secrecy jurisdictions,” a term that emphasizes the importance of
the tax haven as a legal construct, that is, as a set of laws, regulations, and legal procedures
set up explicitly to benefit foreign investors and customers. The concept of “secrecy” with
regards to tax havens has two dimensions: a) confidentiality; and b) lack of cooperation. Tax
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havens create laws that permit financial institutions to keep information regarding their
account holders and their transactions completely confidential, to the extent of, in the case
of The Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law of 1976 discussed above, making it a
criminal offense to both request – and to reveal – information about an account holder in a
Cayman Islands bank. The more common, less aggressive version of this type of secrecy is
for financial institutions on tax havens to require only the bare minimum of information
regarding their account holders, and requiring an official request from a law enforcement
agency from the account holder’s home country to divulge that information (Ambrosanio &
Caroppo, 2005: 686; Cobham, Jansky, & Meinzer, 2015: 2-9; Irish, 1982: 453-4; OECD, 1998:
23; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 9).
For example, if an American drug dealer deposited $1 million in a bank account on
the Cook Islands, the only way the bankers would divulge that information is if the
American Drug Enforcement Agency was able to officially request that release based on
information conclusively demonstrating that the $1 million was the proceeds of a specific
crime. Note that it is not sufficient for, say, the Internal Revenue Service to request the drug
dealer’s account information on the grounds that they avoided paying taxes in the United
States, as they haven’t broken any tax evasion laws in the Cook Islands. This behavior by tax
haven authorities is also an example of the second dimension of banking secrecy: a general
lack of cooperation with non-tax haven countries in enforcing their laws or assisting them in
any significant way. This non-cooperation has its legal basis in British common law
precedent established by Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, [1924] 1
K.B. 461 (1923), which allows financial institutions to keep account holder information
confidential unless they are required to divulge it by a law enforcement agency under
extraordinary circumstances. Most tax havens are or were British Crown Colonies, and as a
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result British common law applies to them, and British common law has several precedents,
including Tournier, that allow tax havens to establish secrecy laws allowing them to function
as secrecy jurisdictions.
In addition, this lack of cooperation extends to international law as well, as another
characteristic of tax havens is an absence of participation in bilateral income tax treaties
(DTTs) 3, or treaties signed between two countries agreeing not to tax any income repatriated
from one signatory country to the other. For example, America has a DTT with Canada,
which means that American residents who make money off a transaction in Canada and are
taxed on that income by Canadian authorities will not be taxed again on that same
transaction when the money returns to America. Tax havens refuse to sign DTTs, and in
general will refuse to cooperate with national or international authorities unless they are
forced (Ambrosanio & Caroppo, 2005: 686; Beard, 1985-1986: 523 fn 13; Cobham, Jansky, &
Meinzer, 2015: 2-9; Eden & Kudrle, 2005: 114; Irish, 1982: 453-4; OECD, 1998: 23; Palan,
Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 9).
The third condition that defines a jurisdiction as a tax haven is a legal and regulatory
structure that permits the existence of – or actively encourages – business or financial
operations within their physical borders that enable individuals or firms to conduct the bulk
of their business offshore. These regulations can manifest themselves as: an absence of
exchange control restrictions, making it possible for non-residents to trade in resident
currency, or transfer their holdings from one currency to another; or an absence of a
requirement that any corporate activities be substantial, i.e. anything other than the recording
of transfers of goods or services on paper. The regulations – or their absence – indicate that
the jurisdiction is interested primarily attracting customers interested in tax avoidance or
3

DTT stands for “Double Taxation Treaty.”
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evasion rather conducting actual business. Another term for these types of tax havens are
“booking centers,” because the transactions taking place elsewhere are merely recorded or
“booked” as occurring within the subsidiary located in the tax haven. Another way tax
havens use regulations to create competitive advantages for themselves is by making it
relatively easy or inexpensive for customers to form corporations or register subsidiaries,
allowing customers to maintain operations in their resident jurisdictions while still recording
transactions in the tax haven. The flexibility this ease of incorporation affords allows tax
havens to, ultimately, become entrepot centers for the rest of the world, enabling enormous
flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) both into and out of tax haven financial
institutions (Becht, Mayer, & Wagner, 2008; Dean, 2006-2007: 926 fn 66; Gravelle, 2015: 3;
Irish, 1982: 453-4; Maingot, 1995: 5-6; OECD, 1998: 23; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux,
2010: 21-56).
None of this effort on the part of the tax havens would amount to much if not for
the final condition: self-promotion. Tax havens have to advertise themselves as being tax
havens, to cultivate a global reputation as a jurisdiction in which customers have access to
tax-free secrecy and ease of operation. Part of this promotion is cultivating a modern
technology infrastructure permitting sophisticated financial transactional activity, as well as a
workforce skilled enough and dedicated to financial service provision, but primarily the key
distinction here is that the jurisdiction deliberately sets about creating a certain image. That
image is one of a laissez-faire attitude towards attracting actual investment, focusing instead
on promoting tax avoidance, unrestricted business operation, and a devotion to protecting
the customer’s secrecy. In effect, tax havens are easy for Intergovernmental Organizations
(IGOs) dedicated to their reform like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to find because they have to make their presence known (Addison,
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2009: 706; Beard, 1985-1986: 524 fn 19; Dean, 2006-2007: 926 fn 66; Gravelle, 2015: 3; Irish,
1982: 453-4; Maingot, 1995: 5-6; OECD, 1998: 23; Palan, 2002: 154).
International Collective Action Against Tax Havens
The international community has not sat idly by as more and more jurisdictions
moved to become tax havens; there have been several large-scale organized international
efforts to prevent tax havens from passing and implementing the laws and regulations that
attract foreign capital, and to counteract the deleterious effects of this attraction. These
efforts can be comfortably classified as attempts to impose regimes of appropriate financial
state behavior on the global tax marketplace. A regime is a group of principles – both
explicit and implicit – norms, rules, and a set of operating procedures generated from the
understandings the participants have about appropriate, effective, and moral behavior in a
particular issue area (Keohane, 1982: 334; Krasner, 1982: 185-6; Puchala & Hopkins, 1982:
246). Regimes exist to solve a problem or series of problems, not least of which is the
problem of collective action in a community of sovereign states. Explicating these problems
and developing their solutions requires from the states involved that they: agree on the
nature of both the problems and the solutions; and that they commit to acting to implement
those solutions. Both of these actions require that a group of elites emerge around these
issue areas, both within the states and internationally. These are the people with the expertise
to both understand the problem and implement the solution, and whose involvement is
necessary for the regime to succeed (Keohane, 1982: 354; Puchala & Hopkins, 1982: 246-7).
Another requirement of the regime’s success is that it is legally binding to its
participants. Since states are sovereign, they will not limit their sovereignty voluntarily, so
they must agree to join the regime – as international law only applies to those parties who
agree upon its application – either willingly or by force (Chayes & Chayes, 1993: 180;
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Keohane, 1982: 330; Krasner, 1982: 189). Regime theorists agree that states will reduce their
sovereignty in order to willingly join a regime if it is in their own best interests – or the
collective best interests of their allies – to do so. Joining a regime unwillingly – having a
regime imposed upon a sovereign state is, by contrast, not an indicator of that state’s best
interests, but rather of that state’s power relative to the states demanding membership from
it (Keohane, 1982: 330; Krasner, 1982: 191).
Given that a regime’s purpose is to reinforce a set of principles, i.e. “beliefs of fact,
causation, and rectitude,” norms, i.e. “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and
obligations,” and rules, i.e. “specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action” (Krasner,
1982: 186), and that the behavior of some of the states subject to the regime behave in ways
that violate these principles, norms, and rules, it stands to reason that regimes will be
coercive in applying these principles, norms, and rules to these states in ways that do not
benefit them. These weaker states are then faced with a choice: comply, and act in a way that
does not benefit them as an individual state but benefits the other members of the regime;
or become what Eden and Kudrle (2005) refer to as a “renegade” state, not complying and
facing potential punishment by the regime members for breaking the rules. If we further
take as given that these states are rational, then the reason a state does not comply with the
regime is if that state believes the benefits of not complying are greater than either the
penalties sustained for not complying or the benefits for complying.
This logic is consistent with Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom’s (1996) finding that
regimes succeed – that is, states comply or are effectively punished – when these behaviors
resemble what the states would have done in their absence. That is, regimes exist to codify
and routinize behavior states already find beneficial. Reinforcing this finding is Simmons’s
(2000) conclusion that states are more likely to comply with a regime if their neighbors do,
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and that this condition has more impact on state behavior than the content of the regime
itself. In addition, if, as Abbott & Snidal (1998) argue, “powerful states structure such
organizations to further their own interests but must do so in a way that induces weaker
states to participate,” then this modified realist interpretation explains why regime
enforcement efforts like those put in place by international organizations like the OECD: 1)
focus on punishing tax haven states, which are weaker; and 2) aren’t effective in constraining
tax haven state behavior. Because it serves the interests of elites in regime participant states
for the tax havens to continue to operate while at the same time maintaining power by
appeasing pro-reform elements in government pushing for these regimes.
Dai (2005) provides the theoretical bridge that connects the general theories about
state compliance to the specific behavior of tax havens within the global financial system.
Dai finds that a state’s compliance with a specific regime is as much a question of domestic
influence as external pressure. Dai points out that individuals within a state do not benefit
uniformly from that state’s compliance with a specific regime. Similar to the argument by
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) underpinning selectorate theory, Dai finds that domestic
elites will use their leverage to force states to either comply or not comply with a regime
depending on which outcome is in their best interests. This logic can also apply to the elites
within the states in charge of compliance enforcement: if it is in their best interests for a
state not to comply with a regime – even though they themselves were instrumental in the
regime’s construction – then the state is less likely to comply either through elite pressure or
through a sort of regulatory sabotage, whereupon the elites build in ineffective compliance
mechanisms to the regime (Krasner, 1982: 193; Puchala & Hopkins, 1982: 247), or simply
change the rules to suit the “exigencies of the moment” (Keohane, 1982: 331). Applying this
essentially Grotian logic to tax haven behavior, the reasons why a state might not comply
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with tax fairness or anti-money laundering regimes: either the state – or the selectorate
within the state – has more to gain from not complying and remaining a renegade state; or
the penalties threatened or imposed by ostensibly more powerful non-tax haven states are
ineffective as punishments or deterrents.
Furthermore, liberal international relations principles to the contrary, a tax haven’s
political status as democratic is no guarantee of compliance with regime edicts. While
Simmons (2000: 832) states that “regimes based on clear principles of the rule of law are far
more likely to comply with their commitments,” this tendency in itself does not guarantee
compliance with regimes either. If tax havens see their commitments to their selectorate or
to other states’ elites as more important than their commitment to any abstract
“international community” which, after all, asks only that the state cease those activities that
comprise its economic livelihood without offering much in return, then it is all the more
likely that they will comply with those commitments to their customers rather than to the
regime. This tendency is more likely, according to Simmons (2000), if the tax haven’s
neighbors react in a similar way, as she concludes that state behavior is more likely to be
influenced by the behavior of other states in the region than by the edicts of an regime. As
we will see below, tax havens tend to cluster geographically, and this argument could be one
explanation for that phenomenon. Another structural characteristic explored in depth below
is the relative stability and sophistication of tax haven governance, enabling them to pass
laws and engage in evasive or minimally compliant behaviors that render anti-tax haven
regimes “mostly symbolic in nature” (Addison, 2009: 704).
Symbolism, it turns out, is a weapon that regimes frequently deploy against tax
havens. Specifically, international organizations like the OECD have resorted to “naming and
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shaming” tactics like the creation of blacklists 4 in part to force weak states to behave in a
manner the strong states would prefer, while succeeding at creating norms of international
financial behavior (Abbott & Snidal, 1998: 8). Naming and shaming campaigns are created in
the absence of the regime participants’ inability or unwillingness to take more direct action
against the subjects of the campaign. One way these campaigns work is by negatively
affecting a state’s reputation, thereby constraining its future behavior such that states are
forced into compliance (Tomz, 2007). For example, the OECD has used a blacklisting
campaign to attempt to get tax havens to raise corporate income tax rates and loosen secrecy
laws. As we will see below, however, states can comply with blacklisting campaigns merely by
agreeing to adhere to the strictures the regime is attempting to impose.
This shadow compliance has three different purposes: 1) it allows the blacklisted
state to repair its reputation without actually making any significant changes; 2) it allows the
transnational elites who have created the regime to be seen to be acting affirmatively; and 3)
it creates and transmits the norms that define unacceptable state behavior. In the OECD
case, for example, tax haven states can agree to comply with OECD dictates while not
changing their behavior to get their names removed from the blacklist, but the OECD is at
least able to transmit the message to the wider international community that tax competition
is harmful and unacceptable. Finally, a naming and shaming campaign can have long-term
effects on the states that appear on the blacklist, even briefly: if they acquire the global
reputation as a renegade or pariah state, this will negatively affect the way they are treated by
other individual states and other regimes, and could end costing them more than the initial
action leading to blacklist was worth. Symbolic actions in this case can have real
Ironically, these blacklists play a role in research on tax havens, as they act as useful indicators of
which countries have built up a significant enough reputation and clientele to warrant censure.
4
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consequences (Abbott & Snidal, 1998: 8; Keohane, 1982: 354; Krasner, 1982: 193; Puchala &
Hopkins, 1982: 247).
Benefits vs. Costs of Being a Tax Haven
The question for jurisdictions that considered tax haven status then is: if they run
the risk of becoming pariah states, why become a tax haven? Are the benefits of
weaponizing sovereignty and becoming a tax haven worth the risks associated with stepping
outside the bounds of acceptable state behavior in the eyes of the international community?
Benefit: Increased FDI 5 Inflow
According to James Henry (2016), senior advisor at the Tax Justice Institute, tax
havens currently house at least $24 trillion in private wealth, most of this booked through
offshore branches of global banks such as UBS, Barclays, and Bank of America, making the
money instantly accessible to its holders but unaccountable to government tax authorities,
resulting in what Zucman (2015) conservatively estimates as $200 billion in lost tax revenue.
According to World Bank data, in 2015 FDI inflows to the jurisdictions identified as tax
havens by the author totalled nearly $190 billion, or an average of $5.8 billion per year per
tax haven with populations of four million or fewer. By contrast, non-tax haven countries
with populations of four million or fewer averaged $549 million the same year. When the
population cutoff is 1.5 million, the difference is even starker: tax havens average an FDI of
$4.3 billion, while non-tax havens drop to $276 million. When the population cutoff drops
to 1 million, tax havens average an FDI of $4.2 billion, while non-tax havens drop to $268
million. As a first cut analysis, tax haven jurisdictions appear to generate inbound FDI an
order of magnitude greater than non-tax haven jurisdictions of similar size (see Table 1.1).
FDI = Foreign Direct Investment, or the amount of money flowing from an individual or business
in one country into the business interests in another. This transaction usually takes the forms of incorporating a
new business or buying a controlling interest in an existing one.
5
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This finding is consistent with Blanton & Blanton’s (2012) that FDI is attracted to wellgoverned states.

Table 1.1: Average FDI inflow per jurisdiction in 2015, by population range and tax haven
status
Population

Tax Haven

Non-Tax Haven

0-4 million

$5.8 billion (n = 41)

$549 million (n = 61)

0-1.5 million

$4.3 billion (n = 35)

$276 million (n = 36)

0-1 million

$4.2 billion (n = 33)

$268 million (n = 30)

Data Source: United Nations (UN) Population Division; International Monetary Fund
Balance of Payments Database
NOTE: Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Malaysia are excluded from these tax haven samples
because their populations exceed 4 million.
An additional benefit to attracting FDI inflows with what are essentially financial
services is that startup costs and additional capital outlays to transform a jurisdiction into a
tax haven are much lower than other economic development strategies like boosting natural
resource extraction or industrializing. Because these states are typically small, with small
populations, their public expenditures tend to be relatively low at the outset, 6 and instituting
a low-tax regime has limited impact on public policy. Similar to the point made above
concerning regime theory, one reason small states adopt a low-tax regime is that it doesn’t
require a radical change in daily life. In addition, a low-tax regime makes the tax haven
economic development strategy appealing to the state’s selectorate as their taxes either stay
low or get lower, ensuring that their support for the government implementing the strategy
will continue, increasing the state’s political stability. Furthermore, the tax haven economic
Especially if, as in the case of the Cayman Islands, the population tends towards being culturally
conservative and politically hostile to the idea of social welfare spending (Brittain-Catlin, 2005).
6
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development strategy is a relatively inexpensive one, especially if the jurisdiction is already
positioning itself as a tourist destination, which many tax havens do. In addition to passing
the necessary laws, the jurisdiction needs an airport that can handle both private and
commercial air traffic, a modern telecommunications grid including high-speed Internet
capability, and relatively skilled workforce in law, accounting, and banking as well as clerical
work. Unlike the other economic development strategies available to small islands, becoming
a tax haven does not require extensive public expenditures for mining equipment, or the
direct and associated costs of heavy industry. Despite its myriad faults, the tax haven
economic development strategy can appear to be one with high returns for low expenditures
(Brittain-Catlin, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2004; Persaud, 2001;
Vlcek, 2008).
The associated income benefits are high enough that tax havens are more likely to
become wealthy states than non-tax haven states. Of the ten states with the highest gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita (PPP) in 2016, five – Luxembourg, Macao, Singapore,
Switzerland, and Hong Kong – are tax havens. The number of tax havens in the 2016 top 10
drops slightly to four - Luxembourg, Macao, Singapore, and Malta – when a population cap
of four million is introduced, but rises to six when the cap is both 1.5 million and one
million, with the tax havens being Luxembourg, Macao, Malta, Cyprus, Trinidad & Tobago,
and the Seychelles. The bulk of the other states on the top 10 list are classfied by the IMF as
“resource dependent,” including petrostates Qatar, the UAE, Norway, and Equitorial Guinea
and gas state Brunei (Baunsgaard, Villafuerte, Poplawski-Ribiero, & Richmond, 2012). In
fact, the only states in the top 10 that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent are
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Ireland, 7 Slovenia, New Zealand, and Iceland. Of the last three, Slovenia and New Zealand
have balanced industrial economies, while Iceland depends to an extent on its fishing
industry – as do most small islands (see Table 1.2).

Table 1.2: Top 10 States 2016 GDP Per Capita, (PPP) By Population Range (* = tax haven)
All

0-4 million

0-1.5 million

0-1 million

Qataro

Qataro

Qataro

Qataro

Luxembourg*

Luxembourg*

Luxembourg*

Luxembourg*

Macao*

Macao*

Macao*

Macao*

Singapore*

Singapore*

Bruneig

Bruneig

Bruneig

Bruneig

Iceland

Iceland

United Arab Emirateso

United Arab Emirateso

Malta*

Malta*

Ireland

Iceland

Cyprus*

Cyprus*

Switzerland*

New Zealand

Trinidad & Tobago*

Seychelles*

Norwayo

Malta*

Estonia

St. Kitts & Nevis*

Hong Kong*

Slovenia

Seychelles*

Equitorial Guineao

5 Tax Havens

4 Tax Havens

6 Tax Havens

6 Tax Havens

4 Resource Dependent
States

3 Resource Dependent
States

2 Resource Dependent
States

3 Resource Dependent
States

Data Source: UN Population Division, World Bank
Looking in greater detail at small states that are not tax havens (see Table 1.3), of the
61 states on which data was available, 16 are resource dependent. Of the resource dependent
states, 9 are petrostates, 2 are gas states, and the remaining are mining, either iron, copper,
And a convincing case could be made that Ireland’s economy has benefited greatly from a
preferential tax regime.
7
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diamonds, gold, or bauxite. Of remaining 45 small states that are neither tax havens nor
resource dependent, 17 are agriculture-based (most of those being subsistence agriculture),
10 are basically industrial, 10 are tourism-based, 6 are fishing-based islands, Namibia, which
manages to be have a mining-based economy without being classified by the IMF as
resource dependent, and Djibouti, which the CIA World Factbook lists as having a “port
services” based economy, which is a polite term for piracy (Baunsgaard, Villafuerte,
Poplawski-Ribiero, & Richmond, 2012; Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). Based on this
descriptive analysis, and with a few exceptions, small states that are wealthy are either tax
havens or resource dependent states. Since, by definition, states either have natural resources
on which to be dependent or they do not, tax havens are, in effect, creating a virtual resource
on which they become dependent. This conclusion is supported in part by the observation
that only two states out of 51 tax havens and 47 resource dependent states are classified as
both tax havens and resource dependent states: Bahrain and Malaysia. Either the prosperous
small state develops the resources it has, or it creates its own through lowering taxes and
stiffening secrecy laws.
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Table 1.3: Non-Tax Haven States, by Economic Base and Population Range
(resource dependent states in italics)
1.5 million > 4 million
7 resource dependent, 9 Nonresource dependent

1 million > 1.5 million
3 resource dependent, 3 nonresource dependent

Zero > 1 million
6 resource dependent, 24 nonresource dependent)

Albania (agriculture)

Botswana (diamonds)

American Samoa (fishing)

Armenia (agriculture)

Estonia (industry)

Bhutan (agriculture)

Bosnia & Herzegovina
(industry)

Gabon (oil)

Brunei (gas)

Central African Republic
(agriculture)

Guinea-Bissau (agriculture)

Cabo Verde (tourism)

Congo, Rep. of (oil)

Namibia (mining)

Comoros (agriculture)

Eritrea (agriculture)

Trinidad & Tobago (gas)

Djibouti (port services)

Jamaica (tourism)

Equatorial Guinea (oil)

Kosovo (agriculture)

Faroe Islands (fishing)

Kuwait (oil)

Fiji (tourism)

Lesotho (industry)

French Polynesia (tourism)

Lithuania (industry)

Gambia (agriculture)

Macedonia (industry)

Greenland (fishing)

Mauritania (iron ore)

Guam (tourism)

Moldova (agriculture)

Guyana (gold and bauxite)

Mongolia (copper)

Iceland (fishing)

New Zealand (industry)

Kiribati (fishing)

Nicaragua (agriculture)

Micronesia (agriculture)

Oman (oil)

Montenegro (tourism)

Puerto Rico (industry)

New Caledonia (industry)
Northern Mariana Islands
(tourism)

Slovenia (industry)
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Table 1.3, continued
Togo (agriculture)

Palau (tourism)

Turkmenistan (oil)

Qatar (oil)
Sao Tome and Principe
(agriculture)
Sint Maarten (Dutch)
(tourism)

United Arab Emirates (oil)
Uruguay (agriculture)
West Bank and Gaza
(industry)

Solomon Islands
(agriculture)
St. Martin (French)
(tourism)
Suriname (minerals)
Swaziland (agriculture)
Timor-Leste (oil)
Tuvalu (fishing)

Cost: Becoming a Tax Haven is Not a Foolproof Development Strategy
Becoming a tax haven does not always guarantee a state prosperity, however. It is not
enough merely to change the laws and wait for the money to arrive: a tax haven must
develop a reputation in the global finance community as a tax haven that is both stable
politically and economically and competitive enough either in general or in a particular niche
to warrant opening bank branches and shifting accounts around. Pace Hines (2005) and
Armstrong et al (1998), averaging GDP per capita growth rates from 1970 to 2016
demonstrates that becoming a tax haven is not a guarantee that the economy will grow
steadily. Three jurisdictions – Aruba, Liberia, and Andorra – had negative growth rates, while
six more – Bahrain, US Virgin Islands, Vanuatu, Barbados, and Switzerland – had positive
growth rates of less than 1%. Even so, 39 out of 42 tax havens had positive GDP growth
rates for 1970-2016. And becoming a tax haven seems to make small states better off than
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being resource dependent or just not being a tax haven: the average GDP growth rate for
resource depdendent states with populations of 4 million or fewer from 1970-2016 is 1.95%,
compared the tax haven average of 2.59% over the same time period, while small states that
were neither tax havens nor resource dependent had an average of 1.91%. Of the 17 small
resource dependent states, three – Kuwait, UAE, and Brunei - had negative GDP growth
rates, with three more – Suriname, Mauritania, and Qatar – having GDP growth rates of less
than 1%. States with populations of four million or fewer who are neither tax havens nor
resource dependent fared worse than either tax havens or resource dependent small states:
of the 42 jurisidictions with data available, seven have negative average GDP growth rates
while another eight have average growth rates of less than 1%. So, while the evidence
provideded by this first cut suggests that becoming a tax haven is not a guaranteed path to
financial stability for a jurisdiction, it does seem to be better than the alternatives with which
small states are faced (see Table 1.4).
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Table 1.4: Average Small State GDP Growth Rate, 1970-2016 for Tax Havens, Resource Dependent
States, and Other Small States*
Tax Haven Rate
Resource Dependent Other Small States
Jurisdiction
(%)
Rate (%)
Rate (%)
Albania

2.70

American Samoa

-0.53

Andorra

-0.13

Antigua & Barbuda

2.98

Armenia

3.84

Aruba

-0.92

Bahamas

0.12

Bahrain

0.25

Barbados

0.65

Belize

2.67

Bermuda

1.61

Bhutan

5.56

Bosnia and Herzegovina

10.93

Botswana

5.67

Brunei

-0.71

Cabo Verde

4.74

Central African Republic

-1.02

Channel Islands

1.01

Comoros

-0.31

Congo, Rep. of

1.38

Costa Rica

2.21

Cyprus

3.37
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Table 1.4, continued
Djibouti
Dominica

0.11
2.76

Equatorial Guinea

10.90

Eritrea

1.88

Estonia

4.53

Fiji

1.78

French Polynesia

1.72

Gabon

1.23

Gambia

0.44

Greenland

2.28

Grenada

2.85

Guam

1.14

Guinea-Bissau

0.60

Guyana
Hong Kong

1.60
4.23

Iceland
Isle of Man

2.63
5.68

Jamaica
Jordan

0.40
1.84

Kiribati

-0.40

Kosovo

4.67

Kuwait

-2.63

Latvia

5.31

Lebanon

1.43
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Table 1.4, continued
Lesotho

3.14

Liberia

-1.43

Liechtenstein

2.41

Lithuania

5.48

Luxembourg

2.60

Macao

3.77

Macedonia

1.24

Maldives

4.01

Malta

4.43

Marshall Islands

1.39

Mauritania
Mauritius

3.70

Micronesia

0.73

Moldova

3.22

Monaco

1.99

Mongolia

3.02

Montenegro

2.38

Namibia

0.95

Nauru

14.62

New Caledonia

1.44

New Zealand

1.41

Nicaragua

-0.07

Northern Mariana Islands

-2.60

Oman

1.76
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Table 1.4, continued
Palau
Panama

-0.30
2.71

Puerto Rico

2.12

Qatar

0.63

Samoa

1.64

San Marino

2.48

Sao Tome and Principe

2.58

Seychelles

3.30

Singapore

4.88

Slovenia

2.37

Solomon Islands

0.73

St. Kitts & Nevis

3.64

St. Lucia

2.26

St. Vincent & the Grenadines

3.18

Suriname

0.16

Swaziland
Switzerland

2.72
0.93

Timor-Leste

4.03

Togo
Tonga

0.03
1.59

Trinidad & Tobago

1.87

Turkmenistan

3.73

Tuvalu
Vanuatu

1.52
0.60
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Table 1.4, continued
United Arab Emirates

-1.97

Uruguay
US Virgin Islands

2.08
0.41

West Bank and Gaza Strip
Average

1.66
2.59

1.95

1.91

All states on list – with the exception of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Switzerland – have
populations of 4 million or fewer.
Cost: Tax Havens Become Renegade States
One of the central ironies of the tax haven world is that in order to become a
successful tax haven, a jurisdiction must develop a positive reputation in the international
banking community while at the same time gaining a negative one in the international legal
and diplomatic community. Reputation is critical to developing a clientele as a tax haven, but
jurisdictions that do so – especially if they perceived to be doing so actively and eagerly –
also develop the reputation as a “renegade” state (Eden & Kudrle, 2005) in the international
community; that is, not quite the pariah status of North Korea or Iran, for example, but not
a member in good standing of the international community either.
Generally speaking, a renegade state is one whose “practices are salient to an
international regime but whose behavior does not comply with the descriptive norms and
practices of that regime” (Eden & Kudrle, 2005: 106). A renegade state cannot just be
written off and ignored; its behavior affects the behavior of the other states in the regime,
and therefore the ultimate success of the regime itself. In the case of tax havens, they are
renegades in the regime of international tax harmonization and cooperation the developed
states of the world are attempting to create through IGOs like the OECD and the Financial
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Action Task Force (FATF). As the European states watched the unsuccessful US effort to
attack the problem of lost tax revenue to Caribbean tax havens in the 1980s, they agreed to
use existing IGOs to create tax harmonization regimes. These regimes had three stated goals:
1) international equity, or clarifying which jurisdiction can rightfully tax which income, and
that tax revenue is distributed fairly among jurisdictions; 2) international neutrality, or
creating a tax system that does not influence individual or firm investment decisions; and 3)
taxpayer equity, or equal treatment of individuals within a jurisdiction regardless of the
source of their income. The underlying idea behind the tax harmonization regimes was that
these goals could not be achieved unilaterally, no matter how rich and powerful the state
(Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Hines, 2005; Maurer, 2008).
During the 1990’s, the impetus to create tax harmonization regimes came from
Europe. The Bank for International Settlements formed the Basel Committee in 1974 to
improve financial stability by increasing cross-border banking supervision and cooperation.
The Committee is essentially reactive, having been formed in the wake of the European
financial crises of 1974 and spurred by the failure of BCCI in 1991, created the Working
Group on Cross-Border Banking, which worked with two groups of tax haven-based
bankers and insurers to create the Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision in 1997.
Following the Basel Committee’s lead, the G-7 created two working groups: The Finance
Ministers’ Working Group on Financial Crimes; and the Financial Experts Group. (BIS,
2017; Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Hines, 2005; Maurer, 2008).
The reports by the Working Groups led to an increased effort on the part of the
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to focus on tax haven activity and on the operations of a
specific group of jurisdictions. The efforts by the Basel Committee and the G-7 represented
the more traditional collaborative method of addressing problems within the community of
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nations, i.e. working with representatives of the renegade states themselves to achieve
specific policy goals. In the case of the FSF, and then the OECD and the FATF, the process
used was more aggressive. By 2000, all three groups had gone the additional step beyond
studying and consultation and released blacklists of tax havens whose practices did not
conform to the standards the IGO created. 8 In the case of the FSF, these were jurisdictions
in various stages of non-compliance with regulatory standards of cross-border cooperation.
For the FATF, the blacklisted jurisdictions were those that did not cooperate with them in
implementing their list of best practices for fighting money laundering. Finally, and most
significantly, the OECD created a Forum on Harmful Tax Competition after releasing a
report on harmful tax comeptition in 1998. This forum then released a list of 41 tax havens,
a blacklist whose impact was so great that six jurisdictions agreed to compliance measures
before the list was even released. All three of these lists were released within a few weeks of
each other in the spring of 2000, and as such represented the spearhead of the international
effort to curtail tax haven activity. In terms of Nadelmann’s (1990) five stages of prohibition
regime formation, the IGOs had progressed through stages one – legitimate activity – and
two – redefining activity as a problem – and arrived at stage three – formation of criminal
conventions. The list of tax havens in this study and their presence on the three blacklists is
summarized in Table 1.5 (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; FATF, 2000; FSF, 2000; Hampton &
Christensen, 2002; Hines, 2005; Kudrle R. T., 2009; Maurer, 2008; OECD, 1998).
8
These standards, in their most basic form: little to no tax on income from financial services;
different tax rates and regulations for financial services than for other industries in jurisdiction; laws enforcing a
lack of transparency in financial service activity disclosure; and an absence of laws regulating information
sharing with other jurisdictions or IGOs. (Maurer, 2008)
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Table 1.5: Tax Havens on OECD, FATF, and FSF Blacklists, 2000
OECD
FATF
Jurisdiction

FSF

Andorra

X

X

Anguilla

X

X

Antigua & Barbuda

X

X

Aruba

X

X

Bahamas

X

Bahrain

X

X

Barbados

X

X

Belize

X

X

Bermuda

X (cooperating)

X

British Virgin Islands

X

X

Cayman Islands

X

X

X

Cook Islands

X (cooperating)

X

X

X

Costa Rica

X

X

Curacao

X (as Netherlands Antilles)

X

Cyprus

X (cooperating)

X

Dominica

X

Gibraltar

X

Grenada

X

Guernsey

X

X

Isle of Man

X

X

Jersey

X

X

X
X
X

Hong Kong

Jordan
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Table 1.5, continued
Latvia

(OECD member)

Lebanon
Liberia

X

Liechtenstein

X

Luxembourg

(OECD member)

X

X

X

X

Macao

X

Malaysia
Maldives

X

Malta

X (cooperating)

Marshall Islands

X

Mauritius

X (cooperating)

X

Monaco

X

X

Montserrat

X

Nauru

X

X

X

Niue

X

X

X

Panama

X

X

X

Samoa

X

San Marino

X (cooperating)

Seychelles

X

X
X

X

X

X

Singapore
St. Kitts & Nevis

X

St. Lucia

X

St. Vincent & the
Grenadines

X

X

X
X

X
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X

Table 1.5, continued
Switzerland

(OECD member)

Tonga

X

Turks & Caicos

X

X

Vanuatu

X

X

Virgin Islands (US)

X

Sources: (Dharmapala, 2008; Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Gravelle, 2015; Haberly & Wojcik,
2015; Maurer, 2008; OECD, 2017)
NOTE: The FSF also created a “Major Financial Centers” list at the same time, and this
list includes Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Singapore, and Switzerland. These
jurisdictions received FSF questionnaires regarding offshore activities and never
responded.
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Benefit: International Community Punishes Renegade States Ineffectively
The main problem with the blacklist effort led by the OECD is that it was
compromised from the start. Part of the difficulty multi-lateral efforts to discipline tax
havens face are the result of the historical relationships the enforcing states bear to the tax
havens. Many of the existing tax havens started their Westphalian existences as colonies of
the British Empire, giving them access not just to the English common law tradition, but
also to a potential customer pool for their services. Of the 51 tax havens, 41 were on the
OECD 2000 blacklist. Of these 41, 19 had a direct, legal link to an OECD member state,
while three of the 51 (Latvia, Luxembourg, and Switzerland) were member states
themselves. Perhaps unsurprisingly, none of the three OECD member states were
blacklisted, although they were not the only ones to benefit: every other non-independent
tax haven was blacklisted, although six chose to cooperate with the OECD almost
immediately. In the end, everyone cooperated in one form or another, such that the OECD
currently has no jurisdictions blacklisted as uncooperative, with European states Andorra,
Liechtenstein, and Monaco being the last eliminated in 2009. With nearly half the tax havens
on the blacklist linked to member states, blanket cooperation was the expected outcome
(Eden & Kudrle, 2005; OECD, 2017).
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Table 1.6: Tax Havens and their Relationship to OECD Countries

OECD
Link
France,
Spain

On OECD List
(2000)?

Andorra

Jurisdiction Type and Linkage
Co-principality between France
and Spain

Anguilla

UK overseas territory

UK

Yes

Antigua &
Barbuda

Independent, commonwealth
member

Aruba

Part of Netherlands
Independent, commonwealth
member

Jurisdiction

Bahamas
Bahrain

Yes

Yes
Netherlands

Yes
Yes

Belize

Independent
Independent, commonwealth
member
Independent, commonwealth
member

Bermuda

UK overseas territory

UK

Cooperating

British Virgin
Islands

UK overseas territory

UK

Yes

UK
New
Zealand

Yes

Cook Islands

UK overseas territory
Free association with New
Zealand

Costa Rica

Independent

Barbados

Cayman Islands

Curacao
Cyprus
Dominica
Gibraltar
Grenada
Guernsey
Hong Kong

Autonomous within
Netherlands
Independent, commonwealth
member
Independent, commonwealth
member

Yes
Yes
Yes

Netherlands

No
Yes (as part of
Netherlands
Antilles)
Cooperating
Yes

UK overseas territory
Independent, commonwealth
member

UK

British crown dependency
Special administrative region of
China

UK
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Cooperating

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Table 1.6,
continued
Isle of Man

British crown dependency

UK

Yes

Jersey

British crown dependency

UK

Yes

Jordan

Independent

Latvia

OECD member

Lebanon

Independent

No

Liberia

Independent

Yes

Liechtenstein

Independent

Yes

Luxembourg

OECD member
Special administrative region of
China

Macao
Malaysia

No
Latvia

Mauritius

Independent
Independent, commonwealth
member
Independent, commonwealth
member
Independent, free association
with US
Independent, commonwealth
member

Monaco

Independent

Montserrat

UK overseas territory
Independent, commonwealth
member
Free association with New
Zealand

Maldives
Malta
Marshall Islands

Nauru
Niue
Panama
Samoa
San Marino
Seychelles

Luxembourg

No

No
No
No
Yes
Cooperating

US

Yes
Cooperating
Yes

Independent
Independent, commonwealth
member
Independent city state in free
association with Italy
Independent, commonwealth
member
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UK

Yes
Yes

New Zealand

Yes
Yes
Yes

Italy

Cooperating
Yes

Table 1.6,
continued

St. Lucia

Independent, commonwealth
member
Independent, commonwealth
member
Independent, commonwealth
member

St. Vincent & the
Grenadines

Independent, commonwealth
member

Switzerland

OECD Member
Independent, commonwealth
member

Switzerland

UK

Vanuatu

UK overseas territory
Independent, commonwealth
member

Virgin Islands
(US)

US overseas territory

US

Singapore
St. Kitts & Nevis

Tonga
Turks & Caicos

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Source: Eden & Kudrle, 2005: 116-8
The irony here is that the campaigns to name and shame were not failures as such.
The IGOs were able to get tax havens to successfully comply with their requirements and
were able to either wind the programs down or shift the focus to terrorism financing and
money laundering for organized crime by the end of the decade. From the six early adopters
to the last holdouts, every jurisdiction on the blacklist made a commitment to increased
transparency and improved exchange of information. The problem is that compliance
required a relatively small amount of effort on the part of the tax havens. For example, a tax
haven could get itself reclassified as “cooperative” by the OECD by issuing a press release
stating that the government of the jurisdiction intended to adopt the OCED’s Memorandum
of Understanding, i.e. by promising to change their behavior rather than actually changing it.
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In fact, 31 of the jurisdictions on the OECD blacklist had done just that by September,
2003. In addition, the FSF announced on March 11, 2005 that their own blacklist was “no
longer operative” (Kudrle R. T., 2009: 36). Granted, this compliance has resulted in changes
in tax haven behavior – the establishment of stand-alone financial services commissions, the
creation of corporate registries where none had previously existed, the increased use of laws
like Know Your Customer and other due diligence requirements. The impact of these
regimes on tax haven behavior, however, has been limited, and the continued use of tax
havens for tax avoidance and evasion, as well as money laundering and terrorism financing
has not changed much (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Maurer, 2008; OECD, 2017).
The preliminary analysis bears this conclusion out. Average GDP per capita growth
rates for tax havens with a population of fewer than four million people decreased from an
average of 2.62% for the period of 1970-2000 to an average of 1.90% for the period 20012016, for an overall average of 2.58%, meaning that, on average, growth slowed in tax
havens after the naming and shaming campaigns, but did not reverse or stop. By contrast,
resource dependent states experienced the opposite trend, increasing from an average GDP
per capita growth rate of 1.38% for the period of 1970-2000 to an average of 2.33%,
possibly as the result of Iraq War-era increases in oil prices, although an overall average
increase of 2.03% suggests that the tax haven strategy might be a profitable economic
development model. Finally, small states that were neither tax havens nor resource
dependent demonstrated the same trend as tax havens, dropping from an average GDP
growth rate of 1.97 for the period of 1970-2000 to an average of 1.82% for the period of
2001-2016, for an overall average of 1.92% for the entire period. That non-tax haven states
experienced a similar, though less extreme, trend as tax havens in economic growth implies
that perhaps other macroeconomic factors were responsible for the general decrease in tax
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haven growth rates in the 21st century rather than the blacklist campaign, but clearly more
sophisticated analysis is necessary (see Table 1.7).

Table 1.7: Average GDP Per Capita Growth Rate (%), 1970-2016, populations lower than 4
million
Tax Havens
(n=38)

Resource Dependent States
(n=16)

Other Small States
(n=42)

1970-2016

2.58

2.03

1.92

1970-2000

2.62

1.38

1.97

2001-2016

1.90

2.33

1.82

Data Source: IMF World Development Indicators
The preliminary analysis also helps illustrate the reasons why a jurisdiction would
choose to become a tax haven, even in the face of universal disapprobation: 1) in the
absence of natural resources, it’s a comparatively successful economic development strategy;
and 2) the practical impact of that disapprobation is relatively low. Only one jurisdiction –
Malaysia – can be classified both a tax haven and a resource dependent state, further
reinforcing the argument that jurisdictions become tax havens in order to create a virtual
resource as an economic base. Lacking any resources of their own to create inflows foreign
banking and commercial activity, these jurisdictions choose an alternative in a process that
one would be hard pressed to be called random. As is evident from Table 1.8, tax havens
cluster in neighborhoods like the Caribbean, or the mountains of western Europe, or the
South Pacific. This clustering behavior is to be expected, given that a jurisdiction’s response
to a regime is dictated more by that jurisdiction’s neighbors’ responses than by the regime
itself; that is, it follows logically that there would be groups of jurisdictions out of
compliance with the tax harmonization regime IGOs like the OECD are attempting to
impose (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Simmons, 2000).
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In addition, jurisdictional decision-making vis a vis becoming a tax haven might also
be affected by their prior colonial relationships. According to the information presented in
Table 1.6, approximately half of all tax havens were either British colonies or are still
dependencies. In addition to providing them access to British common law precedents
enabling tax haven behavior, these jurisdictions’ status makes them a natural market for
British individuals and corporations seeking to avoid British corporate taxation. Since Britain
is one of the world’s largest economies, 9 becoming a tax haven for British citizens both
individual and corporate can be a lucrative pursuit. In ranking the top five tax havens by
average GDP per capita, two – the Cayman Islands and Bermuda - are Crown dependencies.
In the case of the Caribbean tax havens, this colonial relationship with Britain meant that,
once the colonies declared their independence, the tax treaty the US and Britain signed in
1945 now applied to them as well, allowing both American and British businesses to use
these new jurisdictions to find the most advantageous tax deal legally. That tax havens have
existing relationships with developed states also helps explain why citizens of those states
would become tax haven customers, even as their governments’ official statements decry the
practice. In fact, the bulk of tax havens’ incorporation and banking activity originates in
OECD states, despite the OECD being the primary organization involved in blacklisting tax
havens. The source of the ambivalence in OECD states is that decision-makers are trying to
simultaneously accomplish two opposing policy goals: 1) create an international tax regime
that doesn’t result in taxable income escaping to the tax havens; and 2) creating a business
environment for businesses in which they can compete, both domestically and
internationally. These goals became even more difficult to accomplish in the face of a
Great Britain had the fifth highest level of GDP of all states in 2016, behind only the US, China,
Japan, and Germany, according to the IMF.
9
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distinct lack of official enthusiasm for punishing tax havens from the Bush administration in
the US in 2001, as well as the continuing prominence of a brace of well-funded advocacy
groups in both Washington DC and London arguing that unfettered tax competition was
actually a net economic good (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Maurer, 2008).

Table 1.8: Tax Havens by Geographic Region (islands in bold ; n = 33)
Europe (13)
Andorra

Cyprus

Gibraltar

Guernsey

Isle of Man

Jersey

Latvia

Liechtenstein

Luxembourg

Malta

Monaco

San Marino

Anguilla

Antigua & Barbuda

Aruba

Bahamas

Barbados

Bermuda

British Virgin Islands

Cayman Islands

Curacao

Dominica

Grenada

St. Kitts & Nevis

St. Lucia

Montserrat
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines

Turks & Caicos

Virgin Islands (US)

Switzerland
Caribbean (17)

South Pacific (7)
Cook Islands

Marshall Islands

Nauru

Niue

Samoa

Tonga

Hong Kong

Macao

Malaysia

Maldives

Singapore

Vanuatu
East and Southeast Asia (5)
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Table 1.8, continued
Africa (3)
Liberia

Mauritius

Seychelles

Jordan

Lebanon

Costa Rica

Panama

Middle East (3)
Bahrain
Central America (3)
Belize

This ambivalence demonstrated towards tax havens by the developed world as a
result of colonial legacy is a key variable in determining whether a jurisdiction will become –
or remain – a tax haven, but there additional political and economic factors. Frequently,
jurisdictions that become tax havens are islands; as Table 1.8 shows, 33 of the 51 tax havens
in this dissertation are islands. Small island economies tend to have a series of economic
disadvantages similar to remote areas, including “restricted comparative advantages,
diseconomies of scale, dysfunctional market structures, high transport costs… limited
natural resources, small labor markets, and deficiencies in professional and institutional
knowledge and experience” (Hampton & Christensen, 2002: 1663). These disadvantages can
limit a jurisdiction’s options for economic development; limited natural resources and a
generally inability to industrialize or farm on a large scale makes the decision to become a tax
haven an obvious one, as long as the jurisdiction believes the benefits outweigh the costs,
and that the jurisdiction can profit from renegade behavior (Eden & Kudrle, 2005;
Nadelmann 1990).
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In addition, other attributes the jurisdiction may have may also prejudice their
decision in favor of becoming a tax haven. First, and most important, they have their
sovereignty which, even at its most limited in the case of the dependencies, is still sufficient
to create the legal and financial institutions necessary to become a tax haven. While tax
havens tend to be better governed than non-tax haven small states, they may lack certain
elements of civic and political life that promote organized opposition, such as an
independent media, organized opposition parties, or institutions of higher education. The
stability created by this better governance is critical to tax haven development; investors are
attracted to stability so states with more stable governments will have higher levels of FDI
than states with less stable governments. In addition, states with more stable governments
are more likely to become tax havens than states with less stable governments. This tendency
could also be driving investment; rather than foregoing short term profits by investing in
stable states, as Barry, Clay, & Flynn (2013) suggest, multinational corporations are actually
seeking out higher profits by investing in states more likely to be tax havens. In addition, the
remoteness of the islands can foster a culture of insularity, one that values unity and secrecy,
and discourages whistle-blowing or outward transparency. This remoteness also creates a
literal barrier between the islands and the ruling authorities, whether the colonizer or any
mainland-based IGOs that give the islands a certain level of autonomy (Dharmapala, 2008;
Hampton & Christensen, 2002).
All small states and islands have many, if not most of, these characteristics, but what
makes the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands more likely to become tax havens than Cuba
and Jamaica? Two factors, which this dissertation will analyze in greater depth in the next
chapter: 1) stable governments that encourage foreign investment; and 2) the ability to
benefit from renegade behavior despite the application of international regimes designed to
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curtail this behavior. The analysis carried out will focus mainly on determining the key
political and economic differences between jurisdictions with small populations that are tax
havens and ones that are not, as well as the nature of the impact the coordinated
international anti-tax haven campaigns had on tax havens, and the foreign individuals and
firms that patronized them.
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Chapter Two
The Scope of Tax Haven Impact and the Ways in which that Impact is Felt
Two hundred and fifty-six trillion dollars. That’s Credit Suisse’s Research Institute’s
estimate for the total amount of wealth in the world, i.e. “the value of financial assets plus
real estate (housing) owned by households, less their debts” (Kersley & Koutsoukis, 2016). If
Gabriel Zucman’s (2015: 3) estimate that 8 percent of this wealth is held in tax havens, then
tax havens are holding around $20 trillion of the world’s wealth. This calculation is
consistent with those made by both Henry (2012: 5) and Palan, Murphy & Chavagneux
(2010: 5). The sheer scope of the financial traffic directed through tax havens demands
serious analysis. In 2015, according to IMF data, 22% of the world’s foreign direct
investment (FDI) inflow moved through tax havens, a calculation again consistent with the
one made by Palan, Murphy & Chavagneux (2010: 52). That is, of the $2.18 trillion of FDI
inflows recorded in 2015, nearly $480 billion was accounted for by tax havens (Gravelle,
2015). 10
As these figures indicate, tax havens provide ample service to both individual and
corporate clients. Estimates for private wealth held in opaque accounts can run to be $7 and
$9 trillion (Henry, 2012: 5), with bank deposits in tax havens running an estimated $3 trillion
per year (Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 62) and individual tax evasion via foreign tax
haven accounts costing the US government around $50 billion (Gravelle, 2015: 27). In fact, a
key customer for tax havens is the banks themselves, with the major global banks such as
UBS, Citi, Barclays, and the aforementioned Credit Suisse accounting for between two-thirds
and three-quarters of all private wealth held in tax havens (Henry, 2012: 32). This wealth is
Since some of the wealthier tax havens like Liechtenstein and the US Virgin Islands refuse to report
their financials, that value is likely several billion dollars higher.
10
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extremely mobile, with the top 21 of the world’s private banks controlling at least $100
billion of cross-border assets, with cross-border lending traffic running at about $12 trillion
per year (Henry, 2012: 32; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 51). This traffic has made
tax havens disproportionately busy: although than have less than 1% of the world’s non-US
population, tax havens generate 2.3% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) and host
nearly 6% of all US employees working overseas (Hines, 2005: 65). This activity is the result
of two basic impacts tax havens have on the level and location of capital in jurisdictions: 1)
the low level of taxation the tax haven levies on income; and 2) the various ways in which
tax havens can facilitate tax avoidance in jurisdictions other than their own (Hines, 2005).
The Incorporation Business
A significant amount of this tax haven activity is generated by the creation and
maintaining of secrecy for both individual and corporate clients. In fact, one manifestation
of that secrecy is that the line between individual and corporate is made intentionally vague
by tax havens. For example, law firms in the British Virgin Islands assist in the creation and
registration of 30,000 corporations each year, while firms in the Seychelles register up to
11,000 (Shaer, Hudson, & Williams, 2014). In addition to the processing fee of a few
hundred dollars to the firm, the tax havens themselves will charge licensing and registration
fees that can cost from $150 on Vanuatu to around $400 on the Isle of Man (Palan, Murphy,
& Chavagneux, 2010: 31). In addition to giving clients a layer of secrecy, the incorporation
business is a key driver of tax haven economic development: it provides jobs for law firms
and government registration clerks and their support staffs, and generates a steady stream of
income for the jurisdictions who attract the clients by not levying taxes on any income to
these corporations. Regulatory cost theories of corporate law and taxation provide an
explanation for tax havens’ ability to profit from cheap incorporations: where a firm decides
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to incorporate depends on how friendly the jurisdiction’s legal environment is, and how
much it costs to incorporate. Tax havens provide legal environments at least as friendly as
non-tax havens, as well as lower incorporation costs, developments which are facilitated by
the growth in the incorporation law firm business, which makes the relocation and
incorporation easier – and less expensive – than ever before (Becht, Mayer, & Wagner, 2008).
Since the vast majority of these corporations exist only in the tax haven registration account
ledgers, on the hard drives of the law firms and banks with which they conduct business,
and as a brass plate on an office or as a post office box – that is, without any significant
property, plant, or equipment – their maintenance cost the tax havens relatively little in
capital outlays or cleaning up the types of environmental disasters common to their
resource-dependent jurisdictional brethren. As long as the client has Internet access with
which to contact the law firms or banks and transfer money, the tax havens can serve their
clients’ needs handily (Gravelle, 2015).
Multi-National Corporations, Transfer Pricing, and Debt Manipulation
Not all transactions are this simple, however. Multi-national corporations (MNCs)
have created several complex, lucrative methods for taking advantage of tax havens. The
most popular method is transfer mispricing, or the manipulation of prices of goods or
services sold across jurisdictions between subsidiaries of a single MNC. Since more than
half of all international trade is intra-MNC (Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010: 18) –
between different companies with the same owner – understanding transfer pricing is critical
for understanding the role of tax havens in international business. Transfer pricing is not
inherently illegitimate; as long as the subsidiaries conduct the trade at an “arm’s length” as if
they were unrelated firms in a competitive marketplace, with the seller setting a competitive
price for the good or service being sold, then this is perceived by government tax authorities
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as being a legitimate transaction. The extent to which an MNC uses the arm’s length pricing
principle can depend on how willing – or able – a jurisdiction’s tax officials are to inquire
about specific transactions. In Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD ) member countries, from which the phrase “arm’s length” originated, transaction
challenges have become a matter of course, whereas transactions in tax havens are less likely
to be challenged. Even if the transaction is not necessarily “arm’s length” – the most
common current example being a transaction involving intellectual property or another
intangible good for which there is no easily established market price, or for a component of
a finished product that is never sold on its own on the market – then it is possible for an
MNC to enact transfer pricing without behaving in a way tax authorities consider abusive
(Dharmapala, 2008; Gravelle, 2015; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010).
A Hypothetical Example: Nike Plays Hide the Swoosh
MNCs can also use the inherent uncertainty created by the sale of intellectual
property and by tax havens to create transfer mispricing. For example, Nike creates a specific
company in Curacao to own its iconic swoosh logo. Nike then has one of its subsidiaries
located in the United States, where corporate taxes on income are relatively high, pay a
licensing fee for the use of the swoosh logo to the Curacao subsidiary, where corporate taxes
on income are relatively low. The fee paid represents corporate income to the subsidiary, and
the tax savings on the transaction represents profit gained from transfer pricing. Nike can
also demonstrate the US-based subsidiary has spent money acquiring the rights to use the
logo, making that subsidiary less profitable in a jurisdiction where taxes on profit are high,
further lowering their tax bill. And since companies do not have to use country by country
reporting of their transactions in their accounting to tax authorities or shareholders, all
anyone will see on a balance sheet is one subsidiary selling use of its intellectual property to
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another subsidiary. And it is possible the Curacao subsidiary will not have to report the
transaction – or any of its transactions – to any government tax authority.
The Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich
Apple Inc. pioneered a more virulent version of transfer pricing called the “double
Irish with a Dutch sandwich” (Duhigg & Kocieniewski, 2012). When Apple sells an iPhone
to a customer in America, the proceeds from that sale go to an Apple subsidiary in Ireland,
where taxes on corporate income are lower than in America. Ireland tax law has a loophole –
which will be closed by 2020 – that allows corporations to transfer profits internationally
without paying any tax on the transaction, thereby allowing Apple to transfer the profits
from the American sale from the Irish subsidiary to one in the Cayman Islands, where no
taxes and strict secrecy laws insure that the profits can stay hidden as long as Apple needs.
Apple created a second subsidiary in Ireland (hence the name) to handle the sale of its
products in Europe. Apple then transfers its profits from the European sales to another
subsidiary it has set up in the Netherlands where, thanks to OECD rules eliminating tax on
transfers of income between EU companies and permissive tax laws in the Netherlands, the
resulting transfer to the first Irish subsidiary can be accomplished tax free, at which point the
profits are again transferred to the Cayman Islands. This practice was soon adopted by
Google and Microsoft, among other MNCs, and became so popular the Irish parliament was
forced to close the loopholes enabling it (Duhigg & Kocieniewski, 2012; Gravelle, 2015).
Some MNCs, however, will not bother with such baroque methods of transfer pricing. The
most basic technique is “reinvoicing” or “misinvoicing,” and involves paying a different price
in a transaction than the one officially recorded, and then taking advantage of secrecy laws
to obscure the actual amount traded. Ways to misinvoice include misreporting the quality or
grade of the good being imported, charging too much or too little for goods or services, or
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simply paying for goods and services that only exist on paper. It is possible that as much as
$1 trillion a year in illicit money transfers occurs using transfer mispricing, half of which
comes from developing countries and most of which passes through tax havens (Baker,
2005; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Shaxson, 2012).
Earnings Stripping
Another popular form is the strategic reallocation of debt among different MNC
subsidiaries, one version of which is known as “earnings stripping.” In this case, the low
corporate tax rates the tax havens offer is more important than the secrecy. The most basic
version is for a subsidiary in a tax haven or other low-tax jurisdiction to make a loan to a
subsidiary in a high-tax jurisdiction. The loan increases the firm’s costs – both in terms of
the debt it takes on and the loan payments it must make - in the high-tax jurisdiction,
lowering its tax bill there, while increasing its income – by creating an asset in the original
loan and income in the loan payments - in the low-tax jurisdiction, thereby making its tax bill
relatively low overall while creating cash. Another method of earnings stripping is for the
MNC to borrow more money from banks in high-tax jurisdictions than they do from banks
in low-tax jurisdictions. This method can be especially useful if the MNC operates in
resource-dependent jurisdictions where extractive industries like oil, gas, or mining have high
property, plant, and equipment costs. The MNC can strike a deal with the government for a
tax rebate and take out operating loans in higher-tax jurisdictions and buy the property and
buy and ship the equipment, concentrating all the debt in the high-tax jurisdiction and all the
income low or zero tax resource dependent one. The income can then be funneled to a
subsidiary in a tax haven. The bulk of MNC cross-border operations involve either or both
of these methods, ensuring that FDI inflows into tax havens range into the trillions of
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dollars (Dharmapala, 2008; Gravelle, 2015; Henry, 2012; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux,
2010).
Tax Havens Characteristics
With this much money at stake, and the desire of the world’s elites – both individual
and corporate – to continue to utilize tax havens so palpable, the motivations for a
jurisdiction to weaponize its sovereignty and become a tax haven are relatively clear. While
the international anti-tax haven regime in the form of the harmful tax competition
campaigns by the OECD and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) may represent an
obstacle in the form of damage to a jurisdiction’s reputation in the global community, the
motivation – a viable economic development strategy in the face of a paucity of acceptable
alternatives – may be stronger. In order to better understand this motivation, and the force
countervailing it, it is important to examine the political, economic, and geographic
characteristics of the tax haven in depth, and compare tax havens to other jurisdictions with
similar characteristics, specifically jurisdictions with small populations and who may or may
not be resource-dependent. Furthermore, it is also important to more closely examine the
international force arrayed against tax havens, and the form it takes as a vehicle for naming
and shaming tax havens into what they classify as more acceptable state behavior. This
examination will then lead to the development of a series of hypotheses and the analysis of
data based on those hypotheses.
Political Characteristics of Tax Havens

Independence
Are tax havens states? The traditional concept of Westphalian sovereignty denotes
states as sovereign within their own borders; that is, a state has its own government and its
own territory (Krasner, 1999). Using this concept to define tax havens as states, however, has
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its limitations. To return to an example from the introduction, the Cayman Islands are
technically a British Overseas Territory, meaning they are not independent from Great
Britain and not sovereign. As such, they are not a member of the United Nations (UN). The
Caymans, however, are self-governing, and are sovereign enough to write and pass the
secrecy laws that allowed them to become one of the world’s most active financial centers
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). In the case of tax havens, this type of limited
sovereignty is relatively common, and tax havens are just as often to meet Robert Jackson’s
definition of a quasi-state in lacking one of the key components of statehood, either control
of territory or political or bureaucratic autonomy (Jackson, 1990). While some tax havens
may not be entirely politically or geographically sovereign, they are juridically so, at least to
the extent that they can write, enact, and enforce their own laws and regulations; these tax
havens are just sovereign enough, hence the use of the term “jurisdiction” rather than
“state” throughout this dissertation.
A look at the list of tax havens in Table 2.1 bears out a relative dearth of sovereign
states: of the 51 total jurisdictions classified as tax havens, one-third (17) are non-selfgoverning. Of those 17, 10 have some level of administrative relationship with the UK, and
its secrecy-friendly system of British common law, while the other seven are split among the
Netherlands (2), New Zealand (2), China (2), and the US (1). In addition, another
characteristic of limited sovereignty that is relatively common in tax havens is their absence
from the UN. As Table 2.1 demonstrates, every self-governing jurisdiction is also a UN
member, and none of the non-self-governing jurisdictions are UN members. If we consider
the UN to be a stand-in for the concept of the “community of nations” whose norms the
anti-tax haven campaigns seek to protect, then one-third of all the jurisdictions already exist
outside that community, including some of the most active (Bermuda, Cayman Islands,
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Hong Kong). Further adding to the confusion, of the 34 tax havens the UN has admitted,
15 were admitted after they had began functioning as tax havens, including Switzerland,
which was finally admitted in 2002. If nothing else, these numbers further demonstrate the
confllicted attitude the global community has regarding tax havens, and how the potential
impact of a campaign to deter tax haven behavior could be compromised (UN, 2017).
Table 2.1: Tax Havens Grouped by Sovereign Status
Self-Governing (n=34)

Non-Self-Governing (n=17)

Andorra, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Dominica, Grenada, Jordan, Latvia. Lebanon,
Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius,
Monaco, Nauru, Panama, San Marino, Samoa,
Seychelles, Singapore, St. Kitts & Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines,
Switzerland, Tonga, Vanuatu

United Kingdom (10): Anguilla, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Gibraltar, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey,
Montserrat, Turks and Caicos; Netherlands
(2): Aruba, Curacao; New Zealand (2): Cook
Islands, Niue; China (2): Hong Kong,
Macao; United States (1): Virgin Islands

Source: Eden & Kudrle, 2005; UN, 2017; Vlcek, 2008
Administering state in parentheses; UN members in italics

Governance Quality
Armed Conflict
The relationship between tax haven status and governance quality is less ambiguous.
When Dharmapala and Hines (2009) analyzed the World Governance Indicator data, they
concluded that tax havens are signifcantly better governed than non-tax havens, providing
three further questions: what do we mean by “governance quality?” Has this situation
changed in the proceeding eight years? And, how do small state tax havens compare in
governance quality to other small states, especially those that are resource dependent
(Dharmapala & Hines, 2009; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011)?
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If jurisdictions make a conscious, rational decision to become tax havens as an
economic development strategy in the absence of better options, then it follows logically
that the jurisdiction would have to have a decision-making apparatus, i.e. a governance
structure, sufficiently sophisticated enough to weigh its options and make that decision. If, as
Dharmapala and Hines (2009: 1058) concluded, “better-governed countries are much more
likely than others to become tax havens,” then the concept of tax havens as rational unitary
actors in an anarchic system – after all, one of the basic assumptions of modern political
scientific thought – making rational choices to enhance their economic health is a
reasonable: we would expect states to maximiize their security, including their economic
security, even at the expense of the other states in the system.
The jurisdictions that become tax havens are not typical states, however; they are, by
comparison, small and weak. As Table 2.1 demonstrates, one-third depend on another state
for their security. Of the 51 total tax havens, only 19 (37%) have any armed forces at all, and
those are all self-governed; not only are all 17 non-self-governed tax havens without military
personnel, but 15 of the self-governed tax havens are as well. Of the tax havens that do have
armed forces personnel, only Malaysia (128,267), Singapore (127,717), Jordan (115,964) and
Lebanon (66,846) have an average number of troops even approaching a typical state’s
conventional force structure (World Bank, 2017). Given this limited force structure, there is
no rational expectation that tax havens would use force unless there was no other option.
In fact, most tax havens are strangers to any sort of armed conflict since 1970 (see
Table 2.2). According to the Armed Conflict Database (Allansson, Melander, & Themner,
2017), only seven tax havens were involved in conflicts: Cyprus, Grenada, Jordan, Lebanon,
Liberia, and Malaysia. For jurisdictions of populations of fewer than four million, the
number drops to six out of 27, whereas non-tax haven states are more balanced, with 42
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non-tax haven states experiencing conflict and 39 not out of a total of 81. This comparison
has a chi-squared value of 7.2 and a probability of 0.7% of being a random difference.
Resource dependent states with populations under four million have a similar split to tax
havens, with seven resource dependent states involved in conflict, with 20 not involved. Of
the 81 non-resource dependent states, however, conflict is even more rare, with 10 nonresource dependent states involved in conflict and 71 not involved. This comparison,
however, has a chi-squared value of 2.8 with a probability of 9.3% of being random,
suggesting that the difference between tax havens and non-tax havens is more stark than that
between resource-dependent and non-resource dependent states, a conclusion the “resource
curse” literature bears out. Comparisons for jurisdictions with fewer than 1.5 million and 1
million have similar results, reflecting the tendency for tax havens to be less conflict-prone.
One caveat, however: small states are less likely to be conflict-prone in general, with chisquared values of 39 for four million, 57 for 1.5 million, and 55 for one million, all with a
probability of 0 of randomness.
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Table 2.2: Conflict Location in States with Less Than Four Million, by Tax Haven and
Resource Dependence Status
Conflict Location 1970-2015

Yes

No

TOTAL

Tax Haven

6

21

27

Non-Tax Haven

42

39

81

TOTAL

48

60

108

Resource Dependent

7

20

27

Non-Resource Dependent

10

71

81

TOTAL

17

91

108

Chi2 values: 7.2 (.007) for tax haven; 2.8 (.093) for resource dependent
Data Source: Allansson, Melander, & Themner, 2017
NOTE: only Bahrain is both a tax haven and resource dependent with a population under four
million people, and it was not a conflict location.
Worldwide Governance Indicators
Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi developed the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) in partnership with the World Bank in order to measure the comparative effectiveness
of the way in which each state exercises its authority. According to Kaufmann, Kray, and
Mastruzzi (2011: 222), this exercise of authority involves “(a) the process by which
governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” With
that in mind, Kaufmann et al created two indicators for each of these three components. For
“(a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced,” they created
indicators measuring “Voice and accountability” and “Political stability and absence of
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violence/terrorism.” For “(b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and
implement sound policies,” they created indicators measuring “Government Effectiveness”
and “Regulatory Quality.” And finally, for “(c) the respect of citizens and the state for the
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them, they created
indicators measuring “Rule of law” and “Control of corruption” (Kaufmann, Kraay, &
Mastruzzi, 2011: 223). In order for a jurisdictional government to make an effective decision
regarding whether to become a tax haven, it would appear that all three components would
be necessary, for citizens to be able to select competent leaders, and for those leaders to
govern in a competent, responsive manner.
Each governance indicator is measured on a scale from -2.5 (worst) to +2.5 (best),
making it possible to calculate an average of WGI scores across indicators. For the purposes
of analysis, I have created three groups of jurisidictions: 1) tax havens; 2) resource
dependent; and 3) jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent. I will
continue to measure these groups using population cutoffs of 4 million, 1.5 million, and 1
million, based on definitions in the literature of what constitutes a “small state” (Armstrong,
De Kervenoael, Li, & Read, 1998; Vlcek, 2008). The purpose of this categorization is to test
the assumptions that tax havens are better governed than other states, and that this includes
other small states, as weell as to understand the ways in which tax havens – which have
created “virtual resources” – are different from actual resource dependent states. See the
appendix for the various lists of classification by status and population level.
Governance Quality Hypotheses
If becoming a tax haven is a conscious economic development strategy decision,
then the government making the decision must function at a relatively high level. The
government must weigh the alternatives, consider the possibility of punishment, and have a
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government and polity stable enough to attract foreign investment. While it is true that small
states in general will also have the features of stable governance, tax havens with populations
greater than 4 million should also have strong governance in order to function as a tax
haven. Therefore, based on this argument, it is possible to generate the following two
hypotheses:
H1: Tax havens will have higher governance levels than non-tax havens, regardless of population
level.
H2: Tax havens with small populations will have higher governance levels than non-tax havens
with small populations.
Bivariate Analysis
As Table 2.3 shows, for all tax havens, the average WGI score is 0.65, with a t-score
of -5.84 and a probability that this result is due to chance of .0001. By contrast, the average
for all resource depdendent jurisdictions is -0.49 a t-score of 4.52 and a probability that this
result is due to chance of .0001. The results for average WGI score for jurisdictions that are
neither tax havens nor resource dependent are not significant, which, considering the
population includes every country in the world that is neither a tax haven nor resource
dependent (121, as opposed to 46 tax havens and 47 resource dependent jurisdictions) and
have no common unifying feature, is hardly surprising. In general terms, though, this result
suggests that tax havens are better governed than resource dependent jurisdictions.
As Table 2.3 also shows, however, the evidence that tax havens are better governed
than other small states becomes stronger the smaller the populations get, as well as the
evidence that smaller states are better governed overall. Additionally, the proportion of
jurisdictions that are tax havens grows quite a bit, from 22% to 44%; that is, nearly half the
jurisdictions in the world with populations of 4 million or fewer are tax havens. While the
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average WGI score for tax havens with fewer than 4 million people barely changes to 0.62,
with the t-score changing -5.06 and the probability of random outcome still at .0001, the
result of all but three tax havens (Switzerland, Malaysia, and Hong Kong) having
populations of 4 million people or fewer. The results for the 55 other jurisdictions with
populations of 4 million or fewer, however, are significantly different. Only 16 jurisdictions
at this population level are resource dependent, and these 16 are significantly better
governed than states that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent, with an average
WGI score of -0.15, a t-score of 2.33, and probability that this is a random outcome of
0.011. Furthermore, now that the jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource
dependent and with populations of 4 million or fewer have the elements in common that
make small states better governed, their results are now significant. These “neither”
jurisdictions have an average WGI of -0.03, a t-score of 3.01, and a probability that is is a
random outcome of 0.002. Again, these results suggest that jurisdictions with four million
people or fewer do in fact have elements in common that make them better governed, while
tax havens are much better governed than non-tax havens, and jurisdictions that are neither
tax havens nor resource dependent are better governed than resource dependent
jurisdictions. Furthermore, while resource dependent jurisdictions tend to be worse
governed overall, resource dependent jurisdictions with populations of 4 million people or
fewer are better governed than resource dependent jurisdictions with larger populations.
As Table 2.3 further shows, as the population parameters get more restrictive, the
probability that a jurisdiction is a tax haven is closer to being the rule rather than the
exception. Of the 67 jurisdictions with populations of 1.5 million people or fewer, 36 (53%)
are tax havens, with the numbers of resource dependent jurisdictions and jurisdictions that
are neither dropping off more precipitously, with the “neither” group losing nearly half its
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members from the 4 million or fewer level, dropping from 39 to 21. As the numbers drop,
the entire population will take on the characteristics of the tax havens, whose WGI score
rises to 0.70 with a t-score of -4.29 and probability of random outcome still at .0001. The 10
resource dependent jurisdictions also increase their WGI score up to -0.08 with a t-score of
2.55 and a probability of random outcome of 0.007. Likewise, the group of jurisdictions
that are neither resource dependent not tax havens and have populations of 1.5 million or
fewer have a substantially increased WGI score of 0.12 with a t-score of 2.39 and a
probability of random outcome of 0.01. As at the 4 million or fewer population level, tax
havens continue to be better governed than non-tax havens, followed by jurisdictions that
are neither tax havens nor resource dependent, and then resource dependent jurisdictions.
Also as at the 4 million or fewer level, governance scores for resource dependent
jurisdictions and the “neither” group are progressively higher at the 1.5 million population
level than they were before. As populations get smaller, governance levels increase across the
board.
As Table 2.3 finally shows, the trend continues at the 1 million or fewer population
level with one exception. The number of jurisdictions in the world with populations of 1
million or fewer is 60, with 35 (58%) of those being tax havens. As a result of the tax haven
category losing only 1 jurisdiction, the numbers are virtually identical with those at 1.5
million or fewer level. The same is true of the numbers for the jurisdictions that are neither
tax havens nor resource dependent; their number dropped from 21 to 18, and as a result
their WGI score inched up to 0.13, with a t-score of 2.35 and a probability of a random
outcome at 0.011. By contrast, the number of resource dependent jurisdictions with 1
million or fewer is 7 – as opposed to 10 with 1.5 million or fewer – and the loss changed the
results rather dramatically, with the WGI score dropping to -0.18 with a t-score of 2.67 and a
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random outcome probability of 0.005, meaning that as resource dependent states dropped in
population, they got slightly worse governed. This result does not change the overall picture,
however: the pattern still holds, with tax havens being better governed than non-tax havens,
while jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent are better governed
than resource dependent states at any “small state” level. These findings are consistent with
what Dharmapala & Hines found in 2009 using the same data, although this analysis is more
granular, befitting the more complex theoretical questions being asked.
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Table 2.3: Average WGI Score, by population level
All jurisdictions (n=214)
Average

t-score

Pr (random)

Tax Haven (n=46)

0.65 (.09)

-5.84

0.0001

Resource Dependent (n=47)

-0.49 (.08)

4.52

0.0001

Neither (n=121)

-0.04 (.08)

0.82

0.205

Tax Haven (n=43)

0.62 (.09)

-5.06

0.0001

Resource Dependent (n=16)

-0.15 (.17)

2.33

0.011

Neither (n=39)

-0.03 (.11)

3.01

0.002

4 million people or fewer (n=98)

1.5 million people or fewer (n=67)
Tax Haven (n=36)

0.70 (.09)

-4.29

0.0001

Resource Dependent (n=10)

-0.08 (.20)

2.55

0.007

Neither (n=21)

0.12 (.16)

2.39

0.010

Tax Haven (n=35)

0.70 (.09)

-4.14

0.0001

Resource Dependent (n=7)

-0.18 (.25)

2.67

0.005

Neither (n=18)

0.13 (.16)

2.35

0.011

1 million people or fewer (n=60)
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As Table 2.4 demonstrates, tax havens govern in the same manner regardless of
population size. In part, this result is due to most tax havens having populations of one
million or fewer people, meaning that the population being analyzed is not changing that
much. However, the level of consistency in the results for tax havens when the WGI scores
are broken into their component parts is remarkable, and lends further support for the
conclusions that: 1) tax havens are distinct subgroup of states with their own set of unique
characteristics; 2) those characteristics include being relatively well-governed compared with
non-tax havens. Specifically, tax havens excel at government selection, monitoring, and
replacement processes, i.e. giving their citizens the ability to freely participate in choosing
who governs, as well as protecting freedoms of speech and assembly, and creating a stable
political environment unlikley to suffer from political violence (Kaufmann, Kraay, &
Mastruzzi, 2011). These results are especially striking when compared with those of resource
dependent jurisdictions, which, consistent with the conclusions of the “resource curse”
literature, are weakest of all at selection, monitoring, and replacement of the three
jurisdiction types, and in four out of five population categories. Resource dependent
jurisdictions are the least stable, regardless of size (Andersen & Aslaksen, 2013; Robinson,
Torvik, & Verdier, 2006). When it comes to small states, however, jurisidictions that are
neither tax havens nor resource dependent are strongest at selection, monitoring, and
replacement, but not as strong as tax havens.
The second component of the WGI score is the creation and implementation of
sound policies, which includes analyzing the quality of public services provided and the
ability of the government to create and implement sound, pro-growth laws and regulations
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). As Table 2.4 demonstrates, tax havens are uniformly
better at this type of governance than non-tax havens, although less effective at this
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component of governance than the other two areas. Again, the reverse is true for resource
dependent jurisdictions, at least those jurisdictions larger than 4 million people, where sound
policies are relatively stronger than the other two governance categories, although still much
weaker than either tax havens or jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource
dependent. In addition, small states that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent are
uniformly weakest at sound policies, featuring the lowest scores for each jurisdiction type at
every small state population category. When it comes to generating and implementing sound
policies, tax havens are better than non-tax havens at every population level, while resource
dependent jurisdictions are more likely to be better than jurisdictions that are neither at
sound policies in jurisdictions larger than 4 million, while jurisdictions that are neither are
more likely to be better than resource dependent jurisdictions in jurisdictions smaller than 4
million.
The third and final component of the WGI score is the creation of respect for the
rule of law and the control of corruption, or in general the maintainence of respect among
the citizenry and among members of government for the institutions that enforce contracts,
property rights, law enforcement, and the curtailment of the use of public power for private
gain (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). Table 2.4 demonstrates that, as with the other
two components, tax havens are uniformly better at this component than non-tax havens.
And while tax havens are not as effective at creating respect for the rule of law and control
of corruption as they are at selection, monitoring and replacement, they are more effective
at these two components than they are at creating sound policies. Again, this is a matter of
degree, as tax havens are much more effective at all three of these components than are nontax havens. As also might be predicted from close study of the resource curse literature,
resource dependent jurisdictions are uniformly less effective at the rule of law and
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corruption component than are non-resource dependent jurisdictions, regardless of
population size. Jurisdictions that are neither tax havens nor resource dependent are more
effective at this component than resource dependent jurisdictions, but less effective than tax
havens at every small state population.
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Table 2.4: WGI Component Rankings, by Jurisdiction Type and Population Level
Results in italics are insignificant
Tax Havens (n=45)

Resource Dependent (n=47)

All Jurisdictions (n=213)
Neither (n=121)

SMR

.70 (.09)

SP

-.43 (.12)

LC

-.03 (.09)

LC

.65 (.11)

LC

-.52 (.12)

SP

-.05 (.09)

SP

.57 (.13)

SMR

-.54 (.11)

SMR

-.32(.08)

Tax Havens (n=42)

Resource Dependent (n=16)

4 million people or fewer (n=97)
Neither (n=39)

SMR

.70 (.09)

SMR

-.13 (.13)

SMR

.14 (.13)

LC

.60 (.11)

LC

-.15 (.19)

LC

-.02 (.12)

SP

.50 (.13)

SP

-.16 (.21)

SP

-.28 (.12)

1.5 million people or fewer (n=66)

Tax Havens (n=35)

Resource Dependent (n=10)

Neither (n=21)

SMR

.83 (.07)

SP

-.08 (.26)

SMR

.43 (.16)

LC

.69 (.10)

LC

-.11 (.23)

LC

.21 (.18)

SP

.54 (.13)

SMR

-.53 (.16)

SP

-.23 (.18)

Tax Havens (n=34)

Resource Dependent (n=7)

1 million people or fewer (n=59)
Neither (n=18)

SMR

.84 (.07)

SP

-.16 (.34)

SMR

.46 (.17)

LC

.69 (.10)

LC

-.17 (.30)

LC

.21 (.18)

SP

.54 (.14)

SMR

-.20 (.17)

SP

-.28 (.18)

WGI component abbreviations: 1) SMR = selection, monitoring, and replacement; 2) SP = sound policy;
and 3) LC = law and corruption
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Consistent with the conclusions reached by previous analyses of small states, the
lower the population levels get, the uniformly higher the WGI scores get across all
jurisdiction types. This result is due in part to the idea that smaller states are easier to govern,
but it also due to the reality that, the lower the population level gets, the more likely a
jurisdiction is to be a tax haven, and as a result better governed.
Regression Analysis
As Table 2.5 demonstrates, there is support for both hypotheses. The governance
independent variable is positive and significant at both population levels, suggesting that
states that are tax havens are likely to have higher governance levels, and that this likelihood
exists whether the jurisdiction is small or not. As the Small Island Economy research would
predict (Hampton, 1996; Vlcek, 2008), islands also have a positive effect on tax haven status,
as does, intermittently, FDI. As expected, UN membership has a negative impact on tax
haven status, given how few tax havens are UN members. Given that the R2 suggests these
independent variables explain about one-third of the governance index’s impact on tax
haven behavior, it is possible to conclude from this regression that jurisdictions that are tax
havens, islands, and a relatively high standard of living are also going to have relatively high
governance levels.
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Table 2.5

Logistic Regression of Tax Havens, by Governance and population
All States
4 million

Governance

1.093**

1.417*

World Bank
Region

0.075

-0.042

Island

1.915***

2.220**

GDP per
Capita PPP

-0.004

-0.040

UN
Membership

-3.046**

-2.023

Foreign
Direct
Investment

-0.0001

0.0015*

Constant

0.330

0.124

N

192

82

Chi2

53.66

35.29

Pseudo R2

0.294

0.3217

Legend

* p<0.05;

**p<0.01;
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***p<0.001

(two-tailed tests)

Economic Characteristics of Tax Havens
There are four general ways in which tax havens are economically and financially
distinct from non-tax havens: 1) outward-focused economic activity; 2) low or zero taxes; 3)
more affluent; and 4) not resource dependent. It is the argument of this dissertation that
conditions 1), 2), and 3) are the results of explicit economic policy development decisions
and that 4) is a cause of these decisions. Since low or zero taxes and resource dependence
are more a question of description rather than proof and therefore do not require rigorous
testing, this section of the dissertation will generate and test hypotheses only concerning
outward-focused economic activity and affluence.

Outward-Focused Economic Activity
Tax havens are jurisdictions that have made the economic development decision that,
given the absence of more globally-acceptable revenue-creating options like extracting
natural resources or heavy industry, they would create the virtual resources of low taxation
and high secrecy using what sovereignty they have to do so. The economic result of this
decision is that their revenue source is almost entirely external, especially compared with
non-tax havens. Since a jurisdiction’s tax haven activity – banking, accounting, company
incorporation, and other related services - is recorded in economic statistics as an exporting
of financial services, the expected result of a comparison of exports as a percentage of a
jurisdictions Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would be for tax havens to have a higher
percentage of exports as a percentage of GDP than non-tax havens. 11
As Table 2.6 demonstrates, tax havens have higher percentages of exports of their
GDPs than non-tax havens. In fact, when population is not accounted for, tax havens rely
All results for exports and FDI as percentage of GDP for resource dependent states were
insignificant, so the comparison presented is tax havens compared with non-tax havens.
11
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on exports almost twice as much as non-tax havens – 65.22% versus 32.41%. This
proportion moderates slightly at lower populations, with tax haven percentages dipping
slightly (63.85% at 4 million, 64.57% at 1.5 million, and 64.97% at 1 million) and non-tax
havens increasing in their dependence up to around 40% (40.53% at 4 million, 41.07% at 1.5
million, and 39.75% at 1 million), but the relationship remains steady: regardless of
population level, tax haven exports equate to two-thirds of their GDPs, whereas non-tax
havens stay between one-third and 41% of theirs. Tax havens do in fact depend more heavily
on exports for economic stability than non-tax havens.
Another measure of dependence on foreign business for economic stability is the
extent to which a jurisdiction depends on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows. Since
tax havens, by policy design, according to the argument of this dissertation, rely on FDI,
their net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP should be higher than non-tax havens. The
key to the tax haven economic development strategy is to look outward for its revenue.
Lacking natural resources and the population to compete in heavy industry or the postindustrial economic bases, the tax haven must develop the regulations and skills to attract
foreign direct investment in its banks, incorporation businesses, and shell corporations. It
therefore follows that tax havens will be more dependent on FDI inflows than non-tax
havens, and as a result will have higher FDI inflows than non-tax havens. Based on this
argument, it is possible to generate the following two hypotheses:
H3: Tax havens will have higher levels of FDI inflows than non-tax havens, regardless of
population level.
H4: Tax havens with small populations will have higher levels of FDI inflows than non-tax
havens with small populations.
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Table 2.6: Average Exports as Percentage of GDP
All jurisidictions (n=199)
Average %

t-score

Pr (random)

Tax Haven (n=33)

65.22 (7.16)

-7.55

0.0001

Non-Tax Havens (n=166)

32.41 (1.32)

-3.51

0.0004

-2.79

0.004

-2.69

0.005

4 million people or fewer (n=86)
Tax Haven (n=30)

63.85 (7.63)

Non-Tax Havens (n=56)

40.53 (2.67)

1.5 million or fewer people (n=55)
Tax Haven (n=23)

64.57 (8.49)

Non-Tax Havens (n=32)

41.07 (3.73)

1 million or fewer people (n=48)
Tax Haven (n=22)

64.97 (8.88)

Non-Tax Havens (n=26)

39.75 (4.27)

Data Source: World Bank
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Bivariate Analysis
As Table 2.7 demonstrates, this is true, although the results are less robust than they
are for average exports. That said, the results are consistent: in general, tax havens have an
average FDI net inflow of 17.20% of GDP, while non-tax havens have an average FDI
inflow of only 3.01%. Those numbers are virtually unchanged for small states, as tax havens
with populations of 4 million or fewer have an average FDI net inflow of 17.75% of GDP,
while non-tax havens of the same size have an average FDI net inflow of 3.92% of GDP.
The results are similar for the lower population levels of 1.5 million or fewer and 1 million
or fewer, although the probability that these results due to chance (6.3% and 8.1%,
respectively) are too high to make conclusions with any certainty. The results for all
jurisdictions and jurisdictions with populations of 4 million and fewer, however, are robust
enough to conclude that tax havens do depend on FDI inflows to a greater extent than nontax havens, as befits jurisdictions that have decided to base their economic health on
attracting customers from foreign countries.
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Table 2.7: Average FDI as Percentage of GDP, by population
All jurisidictions (n=197)
Average %

t-score

Pr (random)

Tax Haven (n=35)

17.20 (8.31)

-3.67

0.0002

Non-Tax Havens (n=162)

3.01 (0.25)

-1.96

0.027

-1.55

0.063

-1.42

0.081

4 million people or fewer (n=85)
Tax Haven (n=32)

17.75 (9.07)

Non-Tax Havens (n=53)

3.92 (0.54)

1.5 million people or fewer (n=55)
Tax Haven (n=25)

20.38 (11.59)

Non-Tax Havens
(n=30)

3.90 (0.88)

1 million people or fewer (n=48)
Tax Haven (n=24)

21.17 (12.05)

Non-Tax Havens
(n=24)

3.93 (1.07)

Data Source: World Bank. Insignificant results in italics.
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Regression Analysis 12
As Table 2.8 demonstrates, there is support for H4, but not H3. High FDI inflow is
the mark of a healthy national economy, not just tax haven status, and when tax havens are
compared with states like China, the UK, or the US, the relationship between tax haven
status and FDI evaporates. It is, however, significant in tax havens with small populations,
which is logically consistent with the argument, as small states are less likely to have the
resources to be economically competitive, and are therefore more likely to consider
becoming tax havens. Between these results and the R2 values increasing as the population
numbers drop, suggesting that this relationship grows stronger the smaller the population,
jurisdictions that are tax havens and democratic – which strongly correlates to high
governance levels 13 - are more likely to have higher FDI inflows.

The absence of significant variation in the bivariate analyses among the different small population
levels led me to eliminate the 1.5 million and 1 million population cut-points from the regression analyses.
13
Polity IV scores and World Governance Index scores have a correlation coefficient of .68.
12
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Table 2.8

Logistic Regression of Tax Havens by FDI Inflows population
All States
4 million

Foreign Direct
Investment

-0.0001

0.002*

World Bank
Region

0.074

-0.009

Island

0.871

1.464

GDP per capita
PPP

0.037*

-0.034

Polity IV

0.073

0.027

Constant

-3.558***

-2.719**

N

161

52

Chi2

9.27

16.34

Pseudo R2

0.103

0.304

Legend

* p<0.05;

** p<0.01;
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*** p<0.001

(two-tailed tests)

Low or Zero Taxes
Tax havens become tax havens by using what sovereignty they have to lower taxes
and more easily allow private individuals to create corporations for an additional layer of
secrecy. The strategy is that by lowering taxes, increasing secrecy, and easing incorporation,
the customers they attract will make up whatever domestic revenue shortfall there is in
processing and registration fees, as well as customs and import duties and subsidies from
larger states for domestic public goods like security, and finally building “ring fences” with
the municipal tax codes that force residents to pay higher taxes than non-residents (Palan,
Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010). As a result, the expectation is that average corporate income
tax rates in tax havens are lower than in non-tax havens.
Bivariate Analysis
The results demonstrated in Table 2.9 meet these expectations. Given that KPMG
reports that eight tax havens have 0% corporate income tax rates – and 13 more do not
publicize their tax structure at all – the findings that tax haven corporate income tax rates are
8-9% lower on average than non-tax havens is not surprising (KPMG, 2017). Reflecting a
global downward trend in corporate income tax rates, non-tax havens average 25.90%, while
tax havens average 17.23%. As the jurisdiction populations get smaller, tax haven income tax
rates drop, as small state theory suggests they would: 16.92% at 4 million or fewer, 16.10% at
1.5 million or fewer, and 16.03% at 1 million or fewer. The same trend does not hold for
non-tax havens, primarily because some resource-dependent jurisdictions – which tend to be
smaller - use their corporate tax rates for rent seeking: Suriname, for example, has a tax rate
of 36% despite having a population of just over a half million. As a result, the average tax
rate for non-tax havens at 4 million or fewer is lower – 23.87% - than it is for non-tax havens
at 1.5 million and 1 million – 26.32% and 26.13%, respectively. Tax havens and non-tax
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havens respond to the diminshed responsibility of serving a small population in opposite
ways: tax havens impose even lower corporate tax rates and non-tax havens impose higher
rates, suggesting that tax havens take advantage of the reduced burden a small population
represents to lower taxes to attract business, while non-tax havens raise taxes to take
advantage of the business already there.

Table 2.9: Average Corporate Income Tax Rate, by population
All jurisidictions (n=170)
Average %

t-score

Pr (random)

Tax Haven (n=38)

17.23 (1.98)

5.41

0.0001

Non-Tax Havens (n=132)

25.90 (0.65)

2.57

0.006

2.90

0.003

2.37

0.012

4 million people or fewer (n=69)
Tax Haven (n=35)

16.92 (2.14)

Non-Tax Havens (n=34)

23.87 (1.64)

1.5 million people or fewer (n=46)
Tax Haven (n=29)

16.10 (2.51)

Non-Tax Havens (n=17)

26.32 (1.67)

1 million or fewer people (n=40)
Tax Haven (n=28)

16.03 (2.60)

Non-Tax Havens (n=12)

26.13 (2.26)

Data Source: KPMG Global Tax Rates
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Affluence
Jurisdictions undertake the economic development strategy of becoming a tax haven
because it can increase a state’s wealth without costing as much in the way of infrastructure
as other strategies like industry or resource extraction. In addition, tax havens are mainly
states with small populations, meaning that a successful economic development strategy can
increase personal and collective wealth with relative speed and ease (Hampton, 1996;
Hampton & Christensen, 2002). Considering that the decision a jurisdiction makes to
become a tax haven is not without costs or risks, it stands to reason that jurisdictions that
continue tax haven activities in the face of public disapprobation must be doing so because
the financial rewards are significant enough to offset the costs. As a result, the expectation is
that tax havens would be more affluent than non-tax havens. This dissertation follows
common practice and uses GDP per capita to measure affluence, with tax havens expected
to have higher GDP per capita than non-tax havens.
If tax havens are better governed, then it would stand to reason - given that one of
the pillars of good governance according to Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2011), among
others, is having a responsive and representative government – that the decision to become a
tax haven is not solely one made with the approval of elites. Indeed, pace Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2004), well-governed states have larger selectorates and winning coalitions,
meaning that a larger group of a jurisdiction’s citizens have to – at the very least – approve
of the decisions made by the government leading to tax haven status. Therefore, given that
the decision to become a tax haven is an economic development one, i.e. a decision designed
to improve the general economic welfare of the jurisdiction, it stands to reason that the tax
haven’s popular support is the result of the jurisdiction’s citizens sharing in the economic
benefits of the decision. The expectation then becomes that citizens in tax havens will be
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better off than citizens in non-tax havens as result of the decisions the government has
made to become a tax haven and the economic impact these decisions have had. Higher
governance levels implies more governmental stability, which itself implies popular support
for existing governmental policies, so if tax havens have higher governance indicators, then
the citizens of the tax havens must support those government policies. And if citizens of
the tax havens support those policies, it must be because they are made better off
economically as a result of their implementation, leading to the following two hypotheses:
H5: Tax havens will have higher GDP per capita than non-tax havens, regardless of population.
H6: Tax havens with small populations will have higher GDP per capita than non-tax havens
with small populations.
Bivariate Analysis
As Table 2.10 demonstrates, tax havens do have higher GDPs per capita than nontax havens, although the results are not as robust as the others in this chapter. For all
jurisdictions, however, tax havens do have a higher average GDP per capita at $20,118 than
non-tax havens at $12,270. This relationship holds for small states, but the distance between
tax havens and non-tax havens narrows - $19,088 versus $14,427 at 4 million or fewer,
$20,173 versus $14,880 at 1.5 million or fewer, and $20,542 versus $15,722 at 1 million or
fewer - and the results are likely enough to be the result of a random outcome that it is not
possible to say what that relationship is with any degree of certainty. The result for all
jurisdictions, however, is a reliable one, and reinforces the conclusion that tax havens are, in
general, more affluent than non-tax havens.
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Table 2.10: Average GDP Per Capita, by populatiom
All jurisidictions (n=194)

Average

t-score

Pr (random)

Tax Haven (n=35)

$20,118.48 ($2,994.90)

-2.61

0.005

Non-Tax Havens (n=159)

$12,270.38 ($1,248.94)

-1.01

0.157

-0.89

0.188

-0.71

0.241

4 million people or fewer (n=84)
Tax Haven (n=32)

$19,088.13 ($3,160.51)

Non-Tax Havens (n=52)

$14,427.71 ($3,050.06)

1.5 million people or fewer (n=53)
Tax Haven (n=25)

$20,173.02 ($3,675.90)

Non-Tax Havens (n=28)

$14,880.97 ($4,538.59)

1 million people or fewer (n=46)
Tax Haven (n=24)

$20,542.11 ($3,813.03)

Non-Tax Havens (n=22)

$15,722.99 ($5,743.50)

Data Source: World Bank. Insignificant results in italics.
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Regression Analysis
As Table 2.11 demonstrates, there is some support for hypothesis 5, although not for
hypothesis 6, and as much as there is for hypotheses 1-4. Tax havens do have higher GDP
per capita – the generally accepted measure of broadly distributed economic wealth in both
the political science and economics literatures – than non-tax havens, suggesting that
popular support for governments of tax havens is rooted in the economic benefits received
from tax haven policies. The Pseudo R2 is low for this regression, however, suggesting that
this relationship is not very strong. Again, though, it is less possible to draw conclusions
about the relationship between wealth and tax haven status with confidence as it is to draw
them about the relationships between governance and FDI inflows and tax haven status.
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Table 2.11

Logistic Regression of Tax Havens by GDP Per Capita and population
4 million
All States

GDP Per
Capita

0.031*

0.024

Island

0.907

0.846

UN
Membership

(omitted)

(omitted)

World Bank
Region

0.061

-0.035

Polity IV

0.051

0.079

Constant

-3.506***

-1.998*

N

160

52

Chi2

8.05

4.89

Pseudo R2

0.089

0.091

Legend

* p<0.05;

** p<0.01;
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*** p<0.001

(two-tailed tests)

Non-Resource Dependence
If jurisdictions make the decision to become tax havens in part because they do not
have reserves of natural resources like oil, natural gas, diamonds, or copper or other
minerals, then they create the virtual resources of low taxes and strict secrecy to become
economically stable. Comparing the list of resource-dependent jurisdictions compiled by the
World Bank with the list of tax havens gathered from multiple sources, only two jurisdictions
appear on both lists: Bahrain and Malaysia (Baunsgaard, Villafuerte, Poplawski-Ribiero, &
Richmond, 2012). 14 This result conforms with the argument of the dissertation: becoming a
tax haven is an economic development strategy, and jurisdictions that have natural resources
have no need to become tax havens, while jurisdictions that become tax havens do so
because they do not have natural resources to exploit.
The economic profile of a tax haven is that of a relatively affluent jurisdiction whose
wealth is almost entirely dependent on external sources. This wealth is attracted to the tax
haven through the explicit strategy of lowering taxes, a strategy the jurisdiction resorts to in
lieu of any other promising options for revenue generation.
Geographic and Demographic Characteristics

Small Populations
As Table 2.12 demonstrates, tax havens have small populations. Of the 51 tax
havens, 40 have populations of 1 million people or fewer. By extension, therefore, not only
do most tax havens have small populations, but most small jurisidictions are tax havens:
there are 71 jurisdictions with 1 million people or fewer, meaning that 56% of them are tax
havens. This proportion does not change very much if the British Commonwealth
Secretariat’s definition of “small” – 1.5 million – used. The number of tax havens now rises
14

See the appendix for both lists.
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to 41, out of a total of 77, meaning that 53% of all jurisdictions with populations of 1.5
million or fewer are tax havens. The most liberal definition of “small” in a global context is 4
million or fewer; using this criterion, all but three tax havens are included as a small state.
This total of 48 tax havens out of 108 total states with this population criterion translates to
44% of states with populations of 4 million or fewer. Generally speaking, one of every two
small states is a tax haven. To an extent, when the literature (Armstrong, De Kervenoael, Li,
& Read, 1998; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Vlcek, 2008) discusses the political economy
of the small state, it’s discussing tax havens.

4 million or
fewer

Table 2.12: Tax Havens vs Non-Tax Havens as Small States
1.5 million
or fewer

1 million or
fewer

Tax Haven

48

Chi2 =
55.73

41

Chi2 =
61.99

40

Chi2 =
68.42

Non-Tax
Haven

60

Pr =
0.0001

36

Pr =
0.0001

30

Pr = 0.0001

Total

108

77

70

Small states deciding to become tax havens is also a function of the characteristics of
small state economies and demographics. Small states are relatively easy for a small group of
commercial and financial elites – such as the Bay Street Boys – to dominate for their own
advantage. Part of this dominance is the result of the state’s size and population, but also is
the result of secondary effects like a relative absence of an independent media, or of higher
education, meaning that the probability of an organized opposition to a movement towards
becoming a tax haven is low. This absence of opposition is reinforced by cultural factors:
small states tend to have cohesive, tight-knit cultures with strong social networks that make
decision-making easier but discourage whistle-blowing and strenuous debate. And while
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small states translate to a general inability to engage in large-scale enterprises in order to
compete economically, they also have relatively low tax burdens and infrastructure costs,
especially if those costs are being partially offset by a former colonizing state, meaning that
their small population size is both a strength and a weakness. Small size is also, ultimately, a
determining factor in which economic path a state takes (Armstrong, De Kervenoael, Li, &
Read, 1998; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Palan, Murphy, & Chavagneux, 2010; Vlcek,
2008).

Islands
As Table 2.13 demonstrates, two-thirds of the 51 tax havens – 34 - are islands. Of
224 states in the World Bank’s database, 72 of them are islands, meaning that nearly half
(47%) the world’s islands are tax havens. The role islands play in the tax haven economy is
significant enough that it has generated its own subfield in political geography (Cobb, 1998;
Cobb, 2001; Hampton, 1996; Hampton & Christensen, 2002; Vlcek, 2009). Islands that
become tax havens are usually small, but close to major capital exporters like Rotterdam,
New York, or Tokyo, as sharing a time zone and being a relatively short plane ride away was
more important in the pre-Internet era when most jurisdictions made the decions that led
them to become tax havens. Small islands that become tax havens also tend to be densely
populated, which prohibits the dependence on land-based revenue-generators like agriculture
that require protectionist economic policy to thrive, and instead creates a relatively small elite
merchant class that benefit economically from international free trade and can switch
relatively easily to financial service provision (Cobb, 2001; Hampton, 1996; Vlcek, 2008).
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Table 2.13: Comparison of Tax Havens and Islands

Non-Tax haven

Tax Haven

Total

Not island

135

17

152

Island

38

34

72

Total

173

51

224

chi2 = 36.09
Pr = 0.0001

Tax havens are small, wealthy, politically and economically stable, outwardly focused
jurisdictions that tend to avoid conflict and create a political environment that, while not
strongly democratic, at least allows for contestation, free speech, and a relative absence of
corruption which, given the potential for corruption, is all the more remarkable. In fact, tax
havens are the sort of model of small state developing world success stories that
organizations like the World Bank strive to create. Instead, because of the strategy tax
havens pursue to achieve that stability, international campaigns are mounted against them by
states that have long since achieved the wealth and stability the tax havens seek.
International Anti-Tax Haven Campaigns
What do these campaigns involve, and how much of a deterrent to the tax havens do
these campaigns represent? The most significant campaign against tax havens was
undertaken by the OECD starting in 1998. The OECD targeted jurisdictions engaging in
what it called “harmful tax competition” (OECD, 1998). The criteria for judging whether a
jurisdiction was practicing harmful tax competition were: 1) poor or nonexistent information
exchange; 2) complete opacity; 3) either no significant economic activities or ring fencing of
foreign corporations; and 4) zero or very low taxes (Hishikawa, 2002; OECD, 1998). The
OECD published a report called “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue” in
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April 1998 and followed it with the formation of the Forum on Harmful Tax Competition, a
group charged with identifying which jurisdictions were practicing harmful tax competition,
and which were just preferential tax regimes (Eden & Kudrle, 2005; Hishikawa, 2002;
OECD, 1998).
According to the Forum, a preferential tax regime is one in which: income taxes are
either nonexistent or very low; the tax regime applies only to non-residents (“ring fencing”);
and there is an intentional lack of access to information about the level of taxation and who
benefits from it. Harmful or abusive tax havens, by contrast, are jurisdictions that have all the
characteristics of a preferential tax regime, but also publicly advertise themselves as a place
where nonresidents can evade taxes in their home countries. In addition, harmful tax havens
will refuse to cooperate with other jurisdictions in sharing information, as well as the
aforementioned general lack of transparency. Finally, harmful tax havens have no substantial
activity requirment, meaning that firms do not have to undertake a certain amount of
activity in residence at the haven in order to qualify for the regime. According to the OECD,
harmful tax competition has the following effects: altering the location of financial and other
services; erosion of tax base of other jurisdictions; distortion of trade and investment
patterns; diminishment of global welfare; and erosion of the fairness of the tax system, as
well as the resulting erosion of taxpayer confidence in the integrity of the system (Eden &
Kudrle, 2005; Hishikawa, 2002; OECD, 1998).
The OECD decided to counteract what they concluded to be harmful tax practices
by initiating a naming and shaming campaign, and released a list of 41 jurisdictions they
designated “uncooperative tax havens” in June, 2000. “Uncooperative” in this case meant the
OECD had concluded the jurisdiction had the characteristics of a harmful tax haven, they
requested the jurisdiction sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) saying they would
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reform their tax regimes by July 31, 2001, and the jurisdiction had refused. The OECD had
initally identified 47 jurisdictions, but Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta,
Mauritius, and San Marino were able to keep their names off the list by agreeing to reform.
The impact was immediate: by August, 2001, 35 of the 41 jurisdictions on the list had signed
the MOU, and four jurisdictions – Tonga, Seychelles, Curacao (then part of the nowdissolved Netherlands Antilles), and the Isle of Man – had repealed banking legislation.
The pressure on tax havens to reform in 2000 did not just come from the OECD.
The Financial Action Task Force, an international organization affiliated with the OECD
that focuses on anti-money laundering initiatives, released its own list of 15 non-cooperative
jurisdictions, also in June. In addition, the Financial Stability Forum, a group of finance
ministers and central bankers established the G-7 to study and promote methods for
increasing financial stability, divided a list of 37 tax havens into three categories depending
on how well the jurisdictions monitored financial activity – highest quality, average, and
worse than average – and released the list to the public in 2000. Combined with reports by
other international organizations like the European Union’s follow-up investigation to their
1996 “Verona Paper” on preferential tax regimes and tax harmonization in 1999, the Basel
Committee and their insurance arm the Offshore Group of Supervisors, 2000 represented
the high water mark for internationally-coordinated anti-tax haven campaigns (Eden &
Kudrle, 2005; OECD, 1998).
These organizations did achieve a certain measure of symbolic success with the
campaigns. There was opposition to the effort, as Caribbean countries followed Barbados’s
lead and formed the International Tax Investment Organization (ITIO). The group’s
argument was that the OECD and the other IOs were being unfair, that the tax havens had
not been consulted when the policies to which they were being asked to adhere were
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designed. The ITIO further argued that the IOs were targeting only jurisdictions that were
not members of their organizations and ignoring the tax havens like Switzerland or
Luxembourg in their midst. Finally, the ITIO argued that the short timetable – one year –
demonstrated that the IOs were more interested in gaining compliance from the tax havens
rather than in actual reform. The ITIO was joined in their opposition by American right
wing think tanks like the Center for Freedom and Prosperity, whose influence doubtless
contributed to the US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill’s May 2001 public statement
criticizing the OECD’s effort as “too broad” (US Treasury, 2001), signalling that US support
for the anti-tax haven effort going forward would be limited. Despite this opposition, the
OECD persisted, and managed by 2004 to gain MOU signatures from every jurisdiction on
the original blacklist except Andorra, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Monaco, and the Marshall
Islands. The success of the anti-tax haven effort has been that it has protected tax
harmonization as a norm – indeed, as Table 2.7 demonstrates, global corporate income tax
rates are harmonizing to around 25%. The question then becomes, were their targets
materially harmed by the campaign?
If jurisdictions do make the rational calculation to become tax havens, as this
dissertation suggests, then part of that calculation has to include whether they will be
punished and suffer as a result of acting, if not outside international law, then as a renegade
state that assists individuals and firms from other states in evading being held to the laws in
their homelands (Eden & Kudrle, 2005). The primary punishment dealt by the international
community of nations against tax havens was the naming and shaming campaigns of 2000
carried out by the OECD, the FATF, and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), among others,
in which tax havens were threatened with being put on a blacklist if they did not at least sign
agreements stating their intention to comply with international tax harmonization standards
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and change their tax laws. The OECD web site, as of 2017, bragged that every jurisdiction
they targeted as a tax haven either changed their laws or signed an agreement expressing
their intention to do so, implying that the campaign they began in 2000 has been a complete
success in terms of getting recalcitrant jurisdictions to comply (OECD, 2017). By that
metric, the naming and shaming effort was undoubtedly a success, as it was a success in that
these organizations did protect the norms of international cooperation and tax
harmonization; corporate tax rates have been falling since the beginning of the campaign,
and more jurisdictions than not currently have a corporate income tax rate of 25% (KPMG,
2017). The important question, however, is to what extent did the naming and shaming
campaign deter tax haven behavior? If the campaign was truly successful, tax havens would
have experienced a decrease in FDI after 2000, as potential customers found somewhere
more reputable to invest as a result of being warned off by the international community. In
addition, more jurisdictions would make the decision to stop pursuing tax haven policies in
the face of this severe punishment, also causing FDI to decrease. Given the preponderance
of results presented in this dissertation, however, it does not seem likely that tax havens
responded to the campaign in this way, generating the following final two hypotheses:
H7: Tax havens will not have lower levels of FDI inflows after the 2000 naming and shaming
campaign than they did before the campaign, regardless of population.
H8: Tax havens with small populations will not have lower levels of FDI inflows after the 2000
naming and shaming campaign than they did before the campaign.
Bivariate Analysis
As Table 2.14 demonstrates, tax havens actually performed much better on average
in the 15 years following the naming and shaming campaign compared to the 30 years
preceding it – the 30 years referred to as the “golden age” of tax havens in Palan, Murphy, &
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Chavagneux (2010) and Shaxson (2012), among others. It is possible that the naming and
shaming effort had a backfire effect, helping to publicize the tax havens to a wider audience,
thereby increasing FDI inflows. For all tax havens, FDI inflows increased from a precampaign average of $1.6 billion to a post-campaign average of over $6 billion. This result
holds for the tax havens with smaller populations, as well: a pre-campaign average of $605
million compared to a post-campaign average of nearly $4.3 billion for tax havens with
populations of 4 million or fewer; a pre-campaign average of $383 million compared to a
post-campaign average of $3.1 billion for tax havens with populations of 1.5 million or
fewer; and a pre-campaign average of $398 million compared to a post-campaign average of
$3.2 billion for tax havens with populations of 1 million or fewer. Whatever the exact reason
– or combination of reasons – for the comparative increase in FDI inflows in tax havens
following the naming and shaming campaigns of 2000, it is clear that the decision made by
jurisdictions to become tax havens is a rational one; the reward is definitely greater than the
risk, especially when the risk turns out to be minimal.

Table 2.14: Comparison of Average Tax Haven FDI, 1970-2000 vs. 2001-2016

All Tax Havens

Mean 1970-2000 FDI

Mean 2001-2016 FDI

$1,640,547,759.16

$6,007,172,848.08

t-value = -1.74
Pr = 0.0426

Tax Havens 4
million or fewer

$605,163,312.08

$4,293,155,502.67

t-value = -2.24
Pr = 0.0143

Tax Havens 1.5
million or fewer

$383,556,756.55

$3,128,143,469.56

t-value = -1.70
Pr = 0.0473

Tax Havens 1
million or fewer

$398,031,397.16

$3,235,959,035.37

t-value = -1.70
Pr = 0.0479
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Regression Analysis
As Table 2.15 demonstrates, there is statistical support for both hypotheses, although
the support for hypotheses 7 and 8 is more of the “dog that didn’t bark” variety in that the
effect of tax havens on the difference in FDI post-campaign compared to pre-campaign is
insignificant. If the result was negative and significant, then there would be no support for
the hypotheses. The fact that this is not the case, combined with the relatively low R2 for
these regressions, suggests that however FDI difference behaved for all jurisdictions
regardless of population level, it likely had nothing to do with the anti-tax haven campaign.
It is also possible that any negative impact the campaign had was washed away in the
general upward surge of FDI into the global financial system of the 21st century, as
technological developments in communication and travel made tax havens even more
accessible and attractive to potential customers. That this relationship becomes stronger as
the populations get smaller – as indicated by the increasing R2 values - is consistent with the
other results generated by the other regressions in this dissertation, as well as the positive
impact both democracy and existing wealth have on FDI.
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Table 2.15

Regression of Tax Havens by Difference in FDI 1970-2000 vs. 2001-2016
and population
All
4 million

FDI Difference

-0.0001

0.0009

Island

1.082

1.098

World Bank
Region

0.080

-0.079

Polity IV

0.059

0.050

GDP per capita
PPP

0.031*

-0.044

Constant

-3.460***

-1.79*

N

155

49

Chi2

7.24

9.90

Pseudo R2

0.086

0.200

Legend

* p<0.05;

** p<0.01;
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*** p<0.001

(two-tailed tests)

Summary of Findings
Hypotheses Concerning Governance
Hypotheses 1 and 2 concern the relationship between tax haven status and
governance quality. A test of this relationship found it positive, regardless of population
level. Tax havens are better governed than non-tax havens, a finding consistent with the
argument that the process of becoming a tax haven is the result of an economic
development strategy implemented by a rational acting jurisdiction.
Hypotheses Concerning Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Hypotheses 3 and 4 concern the relationship between tax haven status and FDI
inflows. A test of this relationship found it positive, but only for tax havens with small
populations. Small tax havens – those with populations of, at most, 4 million – attract more
FDI inflow than non-tax havens of the same size, a finding consistent with the reality that,
at large populations tax havens are competing against the largest, healthies economies in the
world, and the argument that becoming a tax haven means a jurisdiction makes its economy
dependent on capital inflows to flourish as part of its economic development strategy.
Hypotheses Concerning Citizen Prosperity
Hypotheses 5 and 6 concern the relationship between tax haven status and citizen
prosperity, i.e. are citizens of tax havens better off economically than citizens of non-tax
havens. A test of this relationship using Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (Personal
Purchasing Power) as a measure found it positive and robust, but only for tax havens as a
whole and for tax havens with populations of 1.5 million people or fewer. This finding is
consistent with the argument that, unlike resource-dependent states of similar size, tax
havens are relatively prosperous and that prosperity is relatively evenly distributed amongst
their citizens.
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Hypotheses Concerning International Anti-Tax Haven Campaigns
Hypotheses 7 and 8 concern the relationship between tax haven FDI inflow rates
and the 2000 international naming and shaming anti-tax haven campaign undertaken by the
OECD, among others. If the campaign had been successful, FDI inflows from 2001 to 2016
should be lower than those from 1970-2000, a result of potential customers being dissuaded
from using tax havens and from the tax havens themselves changing the laws and procedures
that defined them as tax havens. A test of this relationship revealed that, for tax havens with
small populations, the reverse is true: FDI inflows actually increased, a finding especially true
for tax havens with populations of 1 million people or fewer – which is to say, most of
them. This finding is consistent with the argument that, in undertaking the strategy to
become tax havens, jurisdictions rationally weighed the benefits of becoming tax havens
against the potential cost of becoming a renegade state in the eyes of the international
community, and found the benefits to outweigh the costs.
General Summary of Findings
The results of the regression analyses of this chapter are consistent with the
descriptive statistics and the first-cut analyses of chapters one and two. Tax havens are more
likely to have higher governance indicators at all population levels, suggesting that they are,
as a class of jurisdictions, well-governed compared to non-tax havens. In tax havens with
small populations – regardless of definition of “small” used – this high governance is related
to higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), both before and after the 2000 anti-tax
haven naming and shaming campaign. In fact, in tax havens with small populations, FDI
actually increased in the wake of the naming and shaming campaign. A final characteristic of
tax havens is a higher level of GDP per capita, meaning citizens of tax havens might be
wealthier than citizens of non-tax havens. One potential criticism of the use of GDP per
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capita is that it favors small states with large incomes, a criticism that might be valid
considering how many tax havens fit this profile. The results, however, demonstrate that this
finding is as true for a large tax haven like Hong Kong as it is for a small one like San
Marino. Tax havens are stable, wealthy, and adept at attracting FDI regardless of
international attempts to prevent them from doing so.
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Chapter Three
Back to the Islands
Cuba, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands took three different
development paths since their decisions of the mid-1960s. The Bahamas and the Caymans
remained tax havens and, as Table 3.1 demonstrates, reaped the benefits. Both relatively wellgoverned, with Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) averages of 1.02 and 1.12,
respectively, the Bahamas and the Caymans prospered, the Bahamas with an average annual
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow of nearly $200 million and an average annual gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita of $20,273. The Caymans in particular became an
economic powerhouse, with an average annual FDI inflow of over $5.3 billion and an
average annual GDP per capita of nearly $50,000, one of the world’s highest.

Table 3.1: Comparison of Main Indicators for Bahamas, Cuba, Cayman Islands, and Jamaica
Governance

Bahamas 1.02
Cuba -0.65
Cayman Islands 1.12
Jamaica 0.09

FDI

GDP/Capita

$199,316,141.93

$20,273.34

N/A

N/A

$5,350,661,261.90

$49,903.03

$305,235,869.13

$7,005.87

Jamaica and Cuba did not fare as well. Turning away from becoming tax havens,
perhaps as a result of poor governmental decision-making as indicated by their relatively low
WGI averages of -0.65 and 0.09, respectively, Cuba and Jamaica used different strategies.
Run by a totalitarian regime with an anti-capitalist philosophy since the beginning of the
time period studied and as a Soviet satellite state until 1989, Cuba took what could be called
a path diametrically opposed to the one taken by the tax havens. As such, there is no
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financial data available, but given that the WGI average correlates to FDI =.34 and to GDP
per capita =.63, saying that Cuba did not prosper economically under this system seems like
a relatively safe conclusion to draw. Jamaica, on the other hand, has managed small but
steady economic growth of around 1% annually, leveraging its location and climate into a
thriving tourism industry and attracting an average annual FDI of over $305 million, or
more than $100 million per year more than the Bahamas. Jamaica, however, has to divide its
GDP over nearly 3 million people, compared to the Bahamas’ 100,000, resulting in an
average annual GDP per capita of nearly one-third as much, or just over $7,000. When
viewed through the dispassionate lenses of geography and political economy, these islands
seem to have relatively similar characteristics. All connected to colonial or geopolitical
patrons to varying degrees, no natural resources around which to build an economy,
relatively small tropical islands with relatively insular populations, but they took three
different strategic paths, and the results of taking those paths illustrate the argument made in
this dissertation: tax havens leverage stable governance into prosperity through an explicit
economic development strategy because this strategy is the best of a limited set of options
available to them.
Implications of Findings and Conclusion
Jurisdictions become tax havens because it is the rational action for them to take.
These jurisdictions – some of which have so little sovereignty that they cannot be classified
as “states” but are closer to Krasner’s (1999) definition of a “quasi-state” - have no other
reasonable options for an economic development strategy. They have little to no natural
resources, and not enough land or people to profitably attempt large-scale agriculture or
industrial projects. What they do have, however, is enough of a post-colonial lifeline to their
former masters to count on them for security and some domestic funding. They have strong
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enough political and governmental institutions to make well-reasoned politically popular
decisions regarding their polity and the ability to competently implement those decisions.
They are culturally unified and tight-knit in a way that ensures that the one product they will
provide to the world – secrecy – will be well-protected and nearly absolute. These cultural
characteristics will probably also act as a counter-weight against dictatorship, corruption, and
unrest – the qualities that tend to scare off potential customers.
Because these customers will come from outside their borders, as they always have.
Most tax havens were formerly trading centers, with a mercantile elite population that
naturally looked outward rather than inward for the sources of its wealth. The Bay Street
Boys were not landed aristocracy: they were lawyers and bankers, natural allies to the new
class of island-hopping offshore experts guiding the jurisdictions toward their new status as
tax havens. These experts were only guiding, however, not controlling; the data and results
presented in this dissertation support the argument that becoming a tax haven is a conscious,
intentional strategy. The jurisdictions are presented with a group of constrained choices for
competing economically; these constraints include the internal lack of resources discussed
above, as well as the external constraint of international disapprobation awaiting them if
they decided to become tax havens. As it turns out, this external constraint is no match for
the economic forces pushing these jurisdictions to become tax havens. This disapprobation
does not come with an actual price tag; the United Nations (UN) has never attempted to levy
sanctions against a tax haven. Indeed, levying such sanctions would be nearly impossible,
given that 34 of its members are themselves tax havens, which illustrates one reason why
international anti-tax haven efforts are so lackluster – the organizations that undertake them
either have tax havens as their members in good standing, or have members whose colonies
or dependencies are tax havens. Even if the member countries of the organizations are not
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formally connected to tax havens, their elites are connected informally as customers. As a
result, recent anti-tax haven efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, have been watered down.
While naming and shaming campaigns can be effective in moderating state behavior in
certain circumstances (Dai, 2005), the anti-tax haven campaigns undertaken at the turn of
the millennium were compromised from the start.
And these campaigns were the height of international anti-tax haven activity. The
results from this dissertation reinforce the general suspicion that these campaigns have
always been ineffective, not least because tax havens have been an integral part of the global
economy since their inception. The rich and powerful have always needed a place to hide
their money – from the state, from the poor, from each other – and in the “golden age” of
the 1970s and 1980s, they were joined by a new group of customers: criminals and, in the
1990s, terrorists seeking to both hide their profits and gain a foothold in the international
financial system in order to better operate transnationally. It is this new class of customer on
whom I will focus as my research moves forward – namely, the role tax havens played in
helping organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations transition from national to
transnational organisms, similar in structure to the multi-national corporations who also use
the tax havens evade billions of dollars in corporate income tax. I also intend to focus on
another class of customer: dictators, who use tax havens to help them become kleptocrats as
they hollow out their countries’ economies. My theory is that the end result of the actions
taken by these three groups and the tax havens that enable them is instability in the states in
which they operate. It is my suspicion that one reason that non-tax havens have lower
governance scores than tax havens is that these groups avoid operating in tax havens so as
not to destabilize them, thereby maintaining the stability of the financial structure on which
their organizations are based. One general argument made in favor of anti-tax haven
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collective action is that their presence destabilizes non-tax havens by depriving them of tax
revenue they would have available to them if tax havens did not exist (Dharmapala, 2008). I
believe that an additional reason for this destabilization is that tax havens enable violent nonstate actors like terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates to more effectively operate
in non-tax havens. States are caught in a pincer attack, prey to destabilizing activity from one
group while being deprived of the tax revenue they would need to help counter that activity
and govern effectively by the other. I further believe that the states that are the least wellgoverned are that way due to these two factors as well as the predations of a third: a dictator
who, by definition, puts his own welfare above that of the citizens in his charge, neglecting
their effective governance in favor of becoming a kleptocrat and stealing as much as possible
without being ousted. All with the help of the tax havens who are, after all, being rational
and seizing the opportunities the global marketplace gives them.
Limitations of Findings
There are two potential limitations to drawing conclusions from the data and analysis
in this dissertation: endogeneity; and the inability to rule out other, equally plausible,
explanations. Or, in other words, it is difficult to determine from the data and results
presented whether jurisdictions become tax havens because they are well-governed small
states, or whether jurisdictions become well-governed small states because they are tax
havens, or whether there is some other force at work driving this relationship. While the data
and the analysis do provide robust support for the argument this dissertation presents,
logical imputation is all there is: the lack of direct observation of the process each
jurisdiction has undergone precludes a more concrete conclusion from being reached.
Greater certainty would require deeper analysis, possibly in the form of several case
studies. The “four islands” sketch is merely intended to illustrate the process of how
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jurisdictions become tax havens with the assistance of the battery of outside experts that
descend on likely jurisdictional candidates. In addition to mapping the political processes
that led to tax haven creation, extensive analysis of when the appropriate laws were passed in
each jurisdiction, as well as determining when each jurisdiction began their marketing
campaign. If, as this dissertation posits, these jurisdictions are rational actors, then it follows
logically that elites in each jurisdiction would recognize the necessity of marketing
themselves as a tax haven in addition to creating the environment necessary to attract
customers. It further follows that, if this were the case, that indicators like FDI inflows and
GDP per capita would increase following the imposition of these laws and the instantiation
of these campaigns. As this research project evolves, the fruits of this research will be
included in future work.
Possible Solutions
As the analysis of this dissertation illustrated, previous attempts to prevent tax
havens from operating have been ineffective. Indeed, it is possible that the primary attempt –
the 2000 international anti-tax haven naming and shaming campaign – had the opposite
effect, increasing FDI flows to tax havens in the years following the campaign. That this
finding is the opposite of the one arrived at by Barry et al (2013) suggests that naming and
shaming campaigns can be effective at deterring foreign investment in some cases – human
rights abuses – but not in others – tax havens. Part of the problem may be that the bulk of
anti-tax haven campaigns take the form of requiring a certain level of compliance from tax
havens. Since these campaigns are hamstrung by elites within the states carrying out the
campaigns – elites who benefit from the tax havens’ continued operations – it is relatively
costless for the tax havens to comply. Tax havens can usually comply in the form of signing
a memorandum of understanding promising to change their laws and practices, or by
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changing reporting laws that effect a certain level of international cooperation while still
protecting their core practices that allow them to continue to function. In addition, tax
havens will cooperate with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in their identification
and prosecution of criminals or terrorists using their banks for money laundering and
financing terror attacks via the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) the FATF operates in each
tax haven. This cooperation – still relatively limited – as well as shifting the focus to money
laundering and terrorism financing has the effect of improving the tax haven’s public image
while protecting the multi-billion-dollar core business of tax avoidance and evasion they
facilitate (FATF, 2017).
Solutions involving punitive international collective action, like the creation of
country by country reporting accounting standards requiring multi-national corporations
(MNCs) to itemize their transactions in each country in which they do business on income
tax statements and annual reports, or a global financial registry recording exactly who owns
which stocks and bonds, or making public registries of beneficial ownership for each
jurisdiction mandatory upon pain of trade sanctions, seem unrealistic as options, as the main
obstacle to these plans is that the economic hegemons of the world – namely, the US and
the UK – are not enthusiastic about their implementation (Christensen, 2011, 2012; Murphy,
2017; Zucman, 2015). This conclusion does not preclude the possibility of collective action
against tax havens in general, however. Avi-Yonah (2000) proposes a uniform withholding
tax on portfolio investment, in which any entity paying interest or dividends would pay the
tax rather than the individual or firm receiving it. As Avi-Yonah (2000) points out, tax
havens may be good places for storing money, but high investment returns are gained by
investing in the US, Japan, or Europe – Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) member countries, in other words. States can make up some of the
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lost tax revenue in this way when the money repatriates as investment capital. In addition, a
tax regime similar to this was in place until 1984, so precedent for this sort of cooperation
among OECD states does exist (Avi-Yonah, 2000; Dean, 2006-2007).
Changing tax haven behavior itself, however, must proceed from the assumption that
tax havens are as much rational actors as any other state. This dissertation has tested this
assumption and found support for it: given a series of constraints, tax havens maximize their
economic well-being by becoming – and continuing to behave as – tax havens. Furthermore,
given the threat of international censure via naming and shaming campaigns, tax havens
again made the calculation to either take symbolic compliance measures but continue
operating as before, or ignore the campaigns altogether, and emerged better off than before.
Given that an international sanctioning campaign with such relatively mild punishments had
so little deterrent effect on tax haven behavior, expecting the international community to
band together to administer stiffer penalties seems naïve at best. One possibility would be
for international enforcement organizations like FATF to partner with OECD and create
economic incentive packages – tax breaks on consumer products, for example – linked to
increased cooperation in the exchange of information on individuals or groups engaged in
illegal activity. Given a healthy enough incentives package to replace lost income, this
cooperation could include targeted, specific information exchange on tax evasion (as
opposed to avoidance). Tax havens, being rational, will agree to cooperate only if it is in their
interests to do so, and this cooperation would require determining the amount of income
the tax haven would lose by cooperating and replacing it while not endangering their core
business. It is important to remember when considering approaches to gaining cooperation
that these strategies must also be palatable to the elites in the states making the offer, as
those elites are tax haven customers and liable to subvert an unpalatable deal. Therefore, any
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attempt to gain tax haven cooperation must preserve, to some extent, the tax havens’ ability
to continue to operate as tax havens.
Dai (2005) concludes that domestic elites have to buy in to any international
agreements for them to succeed, and that this process occurs in both states making the
compliance rules and states being asked to comply with these rules. Any policy
recommendations concerning tax havens must follow from this conclusion, and from the
assumption of rationality stated at the beginning of this section. Tax havens are weak states
in the traditional sense, but they are not weak in the sense that they can successfully resist
any attempts at coercion by traditionally stronger states because of their utility to elites in
those self-same stronger states. Selectorates in both tax havens and states attempting to
enforce anti-tax haven agreements benefit from the failure of those agreements if the
agreements are too punitive, that is, if they harm the ability of tax havens to continue to
provide low tax rates and high levels of secrecy. This dissertation demonstrates that elites
have been using tax havens for the bulk of the 20th and 21st centuries, and these elites, who
are also members of the selectorates of the states attempting to impose anti-tax haven
regimes, personally benefit from the failure of those regimes. In addition, the elites that
make up the selectorates in the tax havens being targeted have staked their livelihoods on the
success of the tax havens’ continued operation, and as a result they too personally benefit
from the failure of anti-tax haven regimes. The people who would benefit from the success
of an anti-tax haven regime – the other 6 billion or so people in the world – are not
members of the selectorate in any meaningful way, and therefore have little impact upon the
regime’s success.
Therefore, any international collective action attempt to mitigate the deleterious
impact tax havens have will by necessity need to focus on the carrot rather than the stick.
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This effort will need to be a collaborative one with the tax havens as willing partners rather
than targets, meaning that the tax havens will need to benefit from any attempt to curtail
their activity. The combination of an economic benefits package that makes importing
goods cheaper and easier to accomplish – especially to the more remote tax havens like the
Maldives or the Seychelles – combined with an expansion of the targeted efforts by the
FATF and other enforcement organizations to focus on illegal activities – is a possible policy
solution that will serve to reinforce norms of good financial conduct, international
cooperation, information sharing, and transparency while having the possibility of being
more than a symbolic success. Tax havens may be weak, but they’re rational, and they have
strong allies, and any successful anti-tax haven campaign must be mindful of this reality.
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Appendix: Jurisdictions by Category and Population Size
Tax Havens:
More than Four
Million (n=3)

More than 1.5 million,
fewer than 4 million
(n=7)
Data set for 4 million

More than 1 million,
fewer than 1.5 million
(n=1)
Data set for 4 million
Data set for 1.5 million

Hong Kong,
Malaysia,
Switzerland

Costa Rica, Jordan,
Latvia, Lebanon,
Liberia, Panama,
Singapore

Mauritius
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Fewer than 1 million
(n=40)
Data set for 4 million
Data set for 1.5 million
Data set for 1 million
Andorra, Anguilla,
Antigua & Barbuda,
Aruba, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Barbados,
Belize, Bermuda,
British Virgin
Islands, Cayman
Islands, Cook
Islands, Curacao,
Cyprus, Dominica,
Gibraltar, Grenada,
Guernsey, Isle of
Man, Jersey,
Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Macao,
Maldives, Malta,
Marshall Islands,
Monaco, Montserrat,
Nauru, Niue, Samoa,
San Marino,
Seychelles, St. Kitts
& Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines, Tonga,
Turks & Caicos,
Vanuatu, Virgin
Islands (US)

Resource Dependent Jurisdictions:
More than Four
Million (n=30)

More than 1.5 million,
fewer than 4 million
(n=6)
Data set for 4 million

Congo, Kuwait,
Algeria, Angola,
Mongolia, Oman,
Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Turkmenistan, UAE
Cameroon, Chad,
Chile, Dem Rep of
the Congo, Ecuador,
Guinea, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Kazakhstan,
Malaysia, Mali,
Mauritania, Mexico,
Nigeria, Norway,
Papua New Guinea,
Peru, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Sudan, Syria,
Venezuela, Vietnam,
Yemen, Zambia

More than 1 million,
fewer than 1.5 million
(n=3)
Data set for 4 million
Data set for 1.5 million
Botswana, Gabon,
Trinidad and
Tobago

Fewer than 1 million
(n=7)
Data set for 4 million
Data set for 1.5 million
Data set for 1 million
Bahrain, Brunei,
East Timor,
Equatorial Guinea,
Guyana, Mauritania,
Qatar, Suriname

Source: (Baunsgaard, Villafuerte, Poplawski-Ribiero, & Richmond, 2012)
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Neither Tax Havens nor Resource Dependent Jurisdictions:
More than 1.5 million,
More than Four Million fewer than 4 million
(n=85)
(n=18)
Data set for 4 million

Afghanistan,
Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bangladesh,
Belarus, Belgium,
Benin, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina
Faso, Burundi,
Cambodia, Canada,
China, Colombia,
Croatia, Cuba,
Czech Rep,
Denmark,
Dominican
Republic, Egypt, El
Salvador, Ethiopia,
Finland, France,
Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, India,
Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Ivory Coast, Japan,
Kenya, Korea,
Kyrgyzstan, Laos,
Madagascar, Malawi,
Morocco,
Mozambique,
Myanmar, Nepal,
Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, North Korea,
Pakistan, Paraguay,
Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania,
Rwanda, Senegal,
Serbia, Sierra Leone,
Slovakia, Somalia,
South Africa, South

Albania, Armenia,
Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
Eritrea, Gambia,
Georgia, GuineaBissau, Jamaica,
Kosovo, Lesotho,
Lithuania,
Macedonia,
Moldova, Namibia,
Puerto Rico,
Slovenia, Togo,
Uruguay
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More than 1 million,
fewer than 1.5 million
(n=2)
Data set for 4 million
Data set for 1.5
million
Central African
Republic, Estonia

Fewer than 1 million
(n=24)
Data set for 4 million
Data set for 1.5 million
Data set for 1 million
American Samoa,
Bhutan, Cape Verde
Islands, Comoros,
Djibouti, Faroe
Islands, Fed States
of Micronesia, Fiji,
French Polynesia,
Greenland, Guam,
Iceland, Kiribati,
Montenegro, New
Caledonia, Northern
Mariana Islands,
Palau, Sao Tome and
Principe, Sint
Maarten (Dutch
Part), Solomon
Islands, St. Martin
(French Part),
Swaziland, Tuvalu

Sudan, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Sweden,
Taiwan, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey,
Uganda, UK,
Ukraine, USA,
Uzbekistan, West
Bank & Gaza Strip,
Zimbabwe
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